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USSR Report

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

VOA VIEW OF SOVIET CSCE PROPOSAL HIT

PM041113 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Article by D. Smolenskaya: "Voice of America Strikes Another False Note"]

[Text] At 0035 hours Moscow time on 29 November, Voice of America broadcast its commentary on the Soviet delegation's speech delivered 5 November at the opening of the Vienna meeting of states belonging to the CSCE.

VOA is usually noted for its commendable promptness. Some of its broadcasts go out long before the events to which they are dedicated. But this time the U.S. Government's high-speed semiofficial radio station took 24 days to consider and interpret the proposals put forward in the speech.

The main matter was the Soviet Union's proposal to convene a representative international conference of states party to the all-European conference on humanitarian questions.

Delay is as grave a professional sin for mass media workers as excessive haste. However, it may be presumed that the authors and editors of the commentary are respected professionals, whose journalistic dignity requires them to be particularly thorough in the analysis of major phenomena and facts. And the station's listeners would have had nothing but thanks for them, had it not been for the fact that this inordinate delay resulted in such seductive disinformation.

Let us listen once more to the relevant VOA passage and compare it with the actual state of affairs:

"The concrete content of this part of Eduard Shevardnadze's speech is the proposal to hold a conference not on human rights, no, but in Shevardnadze's own words on problems of humanitarian cooperation, including contacts among people and questions of information, culture, and education.

"It is noteworthy that Shevardnadze proposes holding a conference in Moscow not on the basis of section seven of the Final Act, which sets out the obligations on human rights of the signatory countries, but on the basis of a document which he called the international bill of rights. What does this mean? The declaration of human rights or the international pacts on civil, political, economic, and social rights?"

The international bill of human rights, described by VOA as a mysterious document that has nothing to do with the international Declaration of Human Rights or the international pacts on civil, political, economic, and social rights is as much a legal reality as Washington's responsibility for the actions of its semiofficial mouthpiece.

The international bill of human rights, which includes both a declaration and pacts, does exist, however much the commentary's authors try to prove the opposite. To see that for yourself, just look at the collection of international documents entitled "Human Rights," published in New York in 1978 by the United Nations in five languages, including Russian.

On page one of the collection it says: "A. International Bill of Human Rights," and under that title there are four documents: "1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2. International Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 3. International Pact on Civil and Political Rights. 4. Optional Protocol to the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights."

It was this unique and universal collection of documents on the basic human rights which was meant when the alarm was sounded from the platform of the Vienna meeting about the disregard of the bill in the United States, where human rights violations are systematic and on a massive scale.

Exposing ignorance is a thankless and, indeed, futile venture. You can simply smile and forget it. But you cannot smile when they deliberately deceive their own and other peoples. The VOA commentary that we are analyzing belongs to that category.

The "defenders of the law" from that office also lie when they assert that the Soviet leadership is proposing to hold a conference in Moscow which is by no means based on the seventh principle of the Final Act and that it "would like to focus attention not on civil and political rights but on economic and social rights, which partly explains the suggestion to use the bill as a basis rather than the humanitarian articles of the Helsinki accords, which place the main emphasis on civil rights."

Well, let us look at the seventh principle of the Final Act, which establishes a direct link between the aims and principles of the UN Charter and its own provisions. It states there in black and white that the member states will adhere to the universal declaration and the international pacts on human rights, in other words--the international bill, whose existence VOA calls a fiction.

Furthermore, it is not only VOA which calls this document a fiction. The United States has not ratified two of its four constituent documents. And since it has not ratified them they do not exist. That is the whole background to this standard piece of disinformation.

By declaring the international bill of human rights nonexistent, VOA has again spoken in defense of its one and only right--the right to deceive people. And it has done so for a patently sinister purpose--to belittle the Soviet Union's proposal on holding a conference in Moscow.

I should like to recall what the Soviet delegation said at the Vienna meeting: The conference in Moscow is conceived as a unique opportunity to "hold a comprehensive discussion aimed at achieving a practical result and to reach a mutual understanding which would make it possible to improve the situation in the humanitarian sphere in all countries taking part in the all-European process." Across the whole range, whether civil and political or social and economic rights. And, to be specific--on questions of reuniting families, contacts between people, and any other questions which now emerge in the sphere of increasing human contacts.

That is the truth.

/8309

CSO: 1825/51

SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

CEMA COMMITTEES MEET IN BUCHAREST

Executive Committee Meets

PM061642 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CEMA Executive Committee Session"]

[Text] The 121st session of the CEMA Executive Committee took place in Bucharest 5 November 1986.

Taking part in the session were the deputy heads of government who are permanent representatives of their countries to the Executive Committee, and the council secretary.

A member of the SFRY Federal Executive Council took part in the session.

The Executive Committee examined questions connected with the organization of work to implement the resolutions adopted by the 42d CEMA session.

The work of the Executive Committee took place in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely cooperation.

Planning Committee Meeting

PM061644 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CEMA Committee Session"]

[Text] Bucharest, 5 Nov--A routine session of the CEMA Committee for Coordination in the Sphere of Planning Activity took place here today. Taking part were the CEMA countries' representatives on the committee and chairmen of the central planning organs of the CEMA countries. A representative from the SFRY took part in the session. A representative from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was present as an observer.

The committee examined questions and adopted decisions on ensuring the fulfillment of the resolutions adopted at the 42d CEMA session and the 120th and 121st sessions of the CEMA Executive Committee and on problems falling within its competence.

The committee also discussed questions of the implementation of measures regarding cooperation in the sphere of the economical and rational utilization of fuel and power, and examined information on the course of implementation of the multinational agreement on the construction of the Krivoy Rog mining enrichment combine by the joint efforts of interested CEMA countries.

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CSO: 1825/52

SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND CEMA AFFAIRS

EDITORS OF SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST THEORETICAL JOURNALS MEET

PM111223 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Dec 86 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Toward Unity of Theory and Practice"]

[Excerpts] An in-depth analysis of the modern world as a unified whole and a bold, innovative approach in assessing the processes taking place in the world community--this was the chief substance of the businesslike and comradely discussion which developed at the Moscow meeting of editors of communist and workers parties' theoretical and political press organs. This forum concluded its work 5 December.

The meeting participants were addressed by A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He answered questions from representatives of the communist and workers parties' press.

The discussion of problems of contemporary world development continued in a creative atmosphere giving scope for a free exchange of opinions. S. Tsukasov, responsible secretary of the theoretical and information journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, spoke of the efficient use of the fraternal communist and workers parties' rich potential in the journal's pages.

Socialism has proved its advantages on a national scale, S. Wronski, chief editor of NOWE DROGI ("New Paths"), the PZPR Central Committee's theoretical and political organ, declared. Today we are faced with the no less complex task of asserting the advantage of the new system on a world scale. It is not the USSR's military superiority or fear of the "threat from the East," the speaker emphasized, that disturbs the U.S. Administration's sleep. It knows that such superiority and such a threat do not exist. But the U.S. Administration does fear the socialist countries' superiority in peaceful development, fears socialism's successes, and fears even our mistakes. Because we know how to draw lessons from them openly and honestly. The speaker backed up this idea with specific facts from the economic and social life of people's Poland in recent years and analyzed the reasons for the difficulties which have arisen. The situation in Poland has now stabilized, he declared, and the 10th PZPR Congress indicated the way to improve all aspects of the life of Polish society. Our entire people are working to fulfill the congress decisions.

When history acquires the possibility of advancing further, the struggle for peace becomes the chief task of all progressive forces, A.L. Salinas, member of the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain [PCPE] Central Committee Executive Committee and chief editor of the newspaper NUEVO RUMBO ("New Course"), the PCPE's central organ, emphasized. Although the socialist countries and the working class are the chief, decisive force in this struggle, the movement for peace is not the prerogative of communists and left forces. Other democratic and peace-loving forces are playing an increasingly active role in it, because civilization's very existence depends on resolving the question of war and peace.

A.W. Qasim, member of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] Central Committee and chief editor of QADAYA AL-'ASR ("Problems of the World"), the YSP Central Committee's theoretical organ, dwelt in his speech on problems of the struggle against the influence of reactionary ideology which seeks to make wide use of religion for its own ends. Our opponents are doing everything to make democratic Yemen turn from the course of socialist orientation. Whenever international imperialism cannot use military force or an economic blockade, he emphasized, it is precisely reactionary ideology that becomes its chief mainstay. With its help our ideological opponents seek to befuddle people's consciousness and to conceal from them the essence and causes of social calamities and the class struggle. It is our party's most important task today to struggle against this influence and neutralize it, the speaker said in conclusion.

The tasks facing people's Mongolia today are crucial and on a large scale, (B. Ligden), member of the MPRP Central Committee and chief editor of NAMYN AMDRAL ("Party Life"), the MPRP Central Committee's political and theoretical journal, said. The key to success in any sector of party work is a creative approach to the matter and the ability to support the masses' initiative and to organize collectives' harmonious working. We must get away from propaganda of well-known truths, the speaker emphasized, take a more profound look at the processes taking place in our society, and focus attention on elucidating urgent problems of socialist building and on questions of developing productive forces and production relations and activating the human factor.

The speaker supported the proposals made during the exchange of opinions for the all possible activation of the struggle for the speediest total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons on a worldwide scale.

Together with the fraternal countries of Vietnam and Cambodia, our country has become the outpost of peace in Southeast Asia, M. (Orabun), deputy chief editor of (ALUNMAY) ("New Dawn"), the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee's journal, pointed out. By following the course formulated by our party we have achieved weighty successes in defending socialism's gains and in the country's socioeconomic development. We express tremendous gratitude to the Soviet Union for its all-around assistance and support.

The role of ideology in educating members of the socialist society is greater than ever today, (Li Chzhan Nam), deputy chief editor of KULLOJA ("Working Person"), the theoretical and political organ of the Workers Party of Korea

Central Committee, emphasized. Our chief task, he emphasized, is to transform the world outlook of all builders of the new society on the basis of working-class ideology and turn them into comprehensively developed people of a communist stamp. Only a politically mature person can become a true builder of socialism and communism. While carrying out three revolutions--ideological, technical, and cultural--we devote special attention to the ideological revolution, the speaker said in conclusion.

Our revolutionary people will always be on the alert, (E. Del Lyano), director of CUBA SOCIALISTA ("Socialist Cuba"), the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee, declared. History shows that those who forget this principle pay a high price for their mistakes.

The noble ideals of internationalism have deeply penetrated our people's consciousness, the speaker continued. They have become the property of their political culture. Internationalism is the foundation of our relations with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. Our party and our people will continue to fulfill their international tasks with honor and to voice solidarity with peoples struggling for their independence and national liberation and against imperialism, colonialism, racism, and Zionism, the speaker emphasized.

In the concluding discussion its participants evaluated highly the results of the forum held on the initiative of the journal KOMMUNIST and spoke of the need to continue such meetings for a regular exchange of opinions on urgent questions of the theory and practice of the communist and workers movement.

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CSO: 1807/99

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

U.S.-USSR TRADE COUNCIL'S 10TH ANNUAL MEETING

PM101227 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy report: "Businessmen's Opinion: The 10th Annual ASTEC Meeting Opens in New York"]

[Text] New York, 8 Dec--The 10th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) is opening here. This influential organization was set up in accordance with an intergovernmental protocol signed during the Soviet-U.S. summit in 1973. At present more than 250 companies, banks, travel agencies, legal, advertising, and publishing firms representing the U.S. side belong to ASTEC. Ten major U.S. concerns joined ASTEC last year alone. They include Westinghouse, McDonald's, the United Chemical Corporation, Sun Oil, and others. The companies belonging to the council now provide around 25 percent of the U.S. gross product.

The Soviet Union is represented on ASTEC by 119 all-union associations, industrial enterprises, and various departments. They include the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inturist, Aeroflot, and the Foreign Trade Bank.

From the legal viewpoint ASTEC is a U.S. corporation founded on the basis of New York State law. The council's supreme organ is the annual meeting. ASTEC's activity is managed by a board of directors, to which 30 representatives from each country are elected. B.I. Aristov, USSR foreign trade minister, and M. Baldrige, U.S. secretary of commerce, have been elected honorary directors of the council.

The council's headquarters are in the Crystal Palace on Manhattan's Third Avenue. There is an ASTEC mission in Moscow. The council's budget is formed on the principles of parity. Decisions taken within the ASTEC framework are formulated jointly by the Soviet and U.S. sides.

The council's activity is aimed primarily at seeking ways to normalize USSR-U.S. trade and economic relations and to support mutual interest in business cooperation and broad scientific and technical exchange. Since it came into being the council has become an important channel for communications between business circles and--through them--between the two countries' governments.

Recently ASTEC has put forward a number of initiatives aimed at developing USSR-U.S. trade and economic relations. On the council's suggestion, the Soviet-U.S. intergovernmental trade commission, inoperative between 1978 and 1985, resumed work, air communications between the two countries were restored, talks on shipping are continuing, and the agreement between the USSR and the United States on promoting economic, industrial, and technical cooperation has been extended for a further 10 years. ASTEC has organized visits to the USSR by representatives of U.S. corporations and visits by delegations of Soviet specialists to the United States.

Over 300 representatives of the business world from the USSR and the United States are taking part in the present annual meeting. Great interest is generated by the forthcoming discussions on the foreign trade reform that is being carried out in the Soviet Union and the functions of the state commission for foreign economic relations and various aspects of the creation of joint enterprises in the USSR in the spheres of agriculture, light industry, the food industry, the power industry, and the chemical industry. It is planned that these enterprises will produce high-quality output to meet the needs of the USSR national economy and for export to the United States and other countries. Interesting suggestions on this score have been received from such well known U.S. companies as Westinghouse, Singer, General Electric, and Litton Industries.

The Soviet Union advocates establishing normal conditions for the favorable development of Soviet-U.S. trade, increasing the trade volume, and equalizing the export-import ratio. The benefits from expanding trade and economic ties between our countries are really tangible. The task is to ensure that the opportunities opening up in this area are not missed.

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CSO: 1825/49

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

BRIEFS

CANADIANS OPPOSE U.S. ARCTIC PLANS--Ottawa December 10 TASS--The parliamentary opposition has called on the Canadian Government not to allow U.S. encroachment on Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. The indignation of the Canadian MP's was aroused by U.S. plans to offer U.S. oil companies areas in the Beaufort Sea for oil and gas development in the Canadian sector of the Arctic. Canada's Foreign Minister Joseph Clark said in parliament that the Canadian Government had protested such encroachment by the United States on Canada's sovereignty six months ago. The U.S. Administration had ignored the protest. The United States also disregarded Ottawa's request that hearings on oil extraction in the north, now under way in Washington, not discuss those areas of the Beaufort Sea, which Canada regards as its own territory. The opposition believes that Ottawa should display firmness in defending the country's sovereignty. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0748 GMT 10 Dec 86] /8309

CSO: 1825/49

WESTERN EUROPE

FRG FIRMS SELL USSR INDUSTRIAL TRACTOR ENGINES

LD291135 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] One of the largest contracts ever between Soviet foreign trade organizations and West German firms has been signed.

At the request of our correspondent, Yuriy Vasiliyevich Kalashnikov, general director of the Avtopromimport association, talks about it:

[Begin recording] [Kalashnikov] The contract has been signed with a number of firms. It is a very interesting deal. It was necessary to resolve the question of creating industrial tractor engines with a power of 500-800 hp and even greater in the future. We had talks with a number of firms in Japan the FRG, and the United States. We chose the FRG firm MTU [Motor Turbinen Union] and signed a contract for the purchase of a large number of engines; we acquired licenses for elaborating a technological design and five contracts for sublicenses.

The choice was made exclusively for the technical advantages of this engine. From the point of view of commercial conditions, one can say directly that it was possible to acquire a rather cheaper engine, but we are not so rich that we can buy a cheaper but not very good article.

This engine really is superior to all existing engines of this type in the world. Implementation of this contract will allow the USSR to begin its own production of engines for large industrial tractors.

[Unidentified correspondent] New technology unfamiliar to Soviet specialists is being bought. How will their training be organized?

[Kalashnikov] We envision the training of Soviet specialists directly at the firm, and also here. Moreover, we have purchased special equipment for a special classroom where training will be organized for specialists servicing the new technology.

[Correspondent] Where will the production base be organized?

[Kalashnikov] The production base is planned for Cheboksary. There is an industrial tractor plant there. And the production of engines for these tractors will be organized there as well.

In 1987 we shall begin to prepare for production. We shall start to make individual parts; we shall acquire other parts from the MTU firm and assemble the engines here. It is planned that within 4 years we shall master production, and in the fifth year we shall fully produce our own engines. And we think that by the year 2000 this will be [words indistinct]

[Correspondent] This is an all-purpose engine. As well as for industrial tractors can it be used in many other sectors of the national economy?

[Kalashnikov] Certainly. It will not be used only on tractors. It can be used, and the firm uses it, for rolling stock, on locomotives, on vessels. It is an engine with a wide range of uses. [end recording]

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CSO: 1825/53

WESTERN EUROPE

FIAT TO SUPPLY TRACTORS TO USSR

LD021643 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS--The Italian firm Fiatallis will supply a large shipment of road building machines to the Soviet Union under a contract signed by Gian Carlo Vezzalini, chairman of the firm's board and chief executive officer, and Anatoliy Burov, acting general director of the Soviet foreign trade association Traktoroexport, in Moscow today.

Under the contract Fiatallis will supply over 250 medium size bulldozers of a new model in 1987 on order from the USSR Ministry of Timber, Pulp-and-Paper and Wood-Working Industry for developing the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East, a TASS correspondent was told at Traktoroexport.

Fiatallis is satisfied with cooperation with its Soviet partners," Gian Carlo Vezzalini told a TASS correspondent. "Under the contracts signed with Soviet organisations the firm has already supplied about 1,000 various road building machines to the Soviet Union," he went on to say.

"It has always been within Fiatallis' interests to extend and diversify cooperation with Soviet counterparts. We are planning to negotiate with the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Building prospects for supplying road building machines to the Soviet Union and, moreover, the possibility of establishing technical cooperation with Soviet plants to design and create a new generation of bulldozers," Vezzalini said.

"The machines could be sold both in the Soviet Union and other countries, including Western Europe," chairman of Fiatallis' board said in conclusion.

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CSO: 1825/50

EASTERN EUROPE

U.S. 'SECRET DOCUMENT' ON ANTI-POLISH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

LD090014 Moscow International Service in Polish 1500 GMT 8 Dec 86

[Valeriy Bushuyev commentary: "Poland in the Fire of Psychological Warfare Against Socialism"]

[Text] Historians of the future will, if possible, bring out the significance of the end of the 1970's period. The system of imperialist rule in the world was creaking at the seams at that time. Regimes in Iran and Nicaragua loyal to Washington were shaken to their foundations and the nationalist [words indistinct] struggle in countries oppressed by imperialism intensified. The demagogic policy of the protection of human rights did not bring the expected results. Attempts at [words indistinct] the role of world socialism, with the aid of all previous doctrines of psychological warfare, met with a clear defeat, the [word indistinct] of nationalism and revisionism.

At the same time in anticommunist ideological centers the successive concepts of undermining the socialist community began to take root. They were based on exploiting political blunders and economic problems of one of the countries of the community in order to strike a blow to the socialist cause. On 17 March 1978 a plan appeared on President Carter's desk prepared by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. This secret document, about which public opinion only learned in 1983, was called a plan for the destabilization of Poland. Its realization by the West's special services contributed to a considerable degree to the Polish drama in the years 1980-81, which, as TRYBUNA LUDU wrote, could have led the country to a fratricidal civil war, destroyed its position within the world community and transformed Poland into a European beggar. The tragedy to which the U.S. experts were condemning millions of Poles was to form a kind of base for proclaiming a crusade against world socialism. This crusade was planned by the neoconservative forces in the United States as the main tasks of the future Reagan Administration.

What was the basis of this anti-Polish plan which became the biggest secret operation of the psychological war of imperialism against world socialism? Selecting Poland as the weakest link among the states of East Europe, the Brzezinski plan was to light a fire in Poland. To this end, the plan stressed, it was necessary to force the Polish Communists to make concessions

in the sphere of human rights, thus creating opportunities for undisturbed activity by antisocialism conspiratorial groupings. Second, the plan stated that the influence of the Polish emigres should be used to the utmost. Recommending the really ruthless use of the terrible situation in which Poland found itself because of its indebtedness to the West, the plan clearly urged that all available means be used to shape the pro-West policy. Stress was placed in particular on the need to erode ideologically the PZPR, its allied parties and the people's state.

The main recommendation for the organs of psychological warfare was contained in the theory that U.S. propaganda be focused on proving the incompatibility of the interests of Poland with the Communist model. It noted the need to form as soon as possible a Polish opposition recruited mainly from people of pro-West moods who had experience in the struggle against the system. The Brzezinski plan defines the main thrust of the planned operation thus: the opposition organized on the basis of illegal and semilegal groupings will be able to form a free popular movement which ought to encompass workers, peasants, intelligentsia and students. These words contained, in a concentrated form, the idea of forming the future pseudo-free and pseudo-independent trade unions. The rest is just a matter of technique. Using the time that was most difficult for Poland, when financial indebtedness reached a critical limit, the allegedly spontaneously created opposition was to challenge socialism in the Polish People's Republic. Our actions, Brzezinski said with his typical self-confidence, ought to lead to the destabilization of the situation in Poland. In such conditions there will be fear and lack of order in the ranks of the PZPR and at this point the opposition will gain masses of supporters. Next, a pluralist government was to be created which would gradually move along the route of the truly pro-West power, according to Brzezinski. If difficulties were to arise on the road of this silent counterrevolution, the author of the plan assumed the creation of an anticommunist uprising. He demanded that the United States use maximum force to activate the development of events in the recommended directions.

It is commonly known that Washington did indeed make the greatest efforts to move events in Poland toward a counterrevolutionary coup. The Polish nation, however, using the assistance of its friends and allies, mobilized all forces in order to frustrate the conspiracy of the enemies of the new Poland and to defend the cause of socialism. Imperialism was dealt yet another crushing blow on Polish soil.

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CSO: 2600/230

EASTERN EUROPE

POLISH CHURCHES' LINKS WITH POLITICS, NATIONALISM SCORED

PM052000 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Special correspondent N. Yermolovich article: "The Word From the Pulpit, Scanning the Polish Press"]

[Text] Churches are an invariable feature of the Polish landscape. The severe lines of the gothic piles along the coastline give way to the intricate forms of the baroque toward the center of the country. While in the very south, in the foothills of the Carpathians, there are exquisite wooden structures created by the local artists of the uplands. There are humble churches with no claim to distinction, and churches which are famous throughout the country and even abroad. During the tourist season, organ concerts at the Oliwa Church are oversubscribed. Even the organ in this church is an outstanding work of art. However, the real gem of the Polish Renaissance is the altar in St Mary's Church in Krakow by Wit Stwosz. It is huge--one of the biggest medieval altars in Europe--carved from lime wood and painted by the artist himself. The master, free from the church dogmas which had fettered artists, depicted the depth and complexity of human nature with the whole force of his talent in shape and color.

But of course it is not just tourists and music lovers who visit the churches. People come not just to admire their interiors and to listen to music. Most of people who come are believers. They come to attend mass, the high point of which is the sermon delivered by the priest.

There are many believers in Poland. It is almost impossible to say exactly how many. But that is not the point. Some people's faith is profound and sincere, but they do not boast about it, they do not make a show of their feelings. Others do not believe in God much, they may even not believe at all, but they go to church ostentatiously and pray piously. The predominant religion is Roman Catholicism.

"The church"--which is how the Catholic Church is referred to in common parlance--occupies a prominent position in Poland. The reasons for this are historical. In an agricultural, peasant country, which Poland was for centuries, the church was the dominant influence in the peasants' life. The church calendar determined and regulated their entire life. Imposed from outside, alien, and introduced not without coercion, it became a tradition in time, a kind of natural norm.

The patriotic role of the Church must not be forgotten either. The point is that practically all the foreign invasions of Poland at different times were carried out by people of other faiths. Let us recall the famous "Deluge"--the occupation of virtually the whole country by the Protestant Swedes. It was the Protestants who threatened Poland from the West. The Tartar and Mongol hordes came rolling in from the East. In the South battles were waged against the Hussites. Relations were no better with the Orthodox principalities of Old Russia or with tsarist Russia later on. Defending itself, its well-being, and its right to existence, the Polish Catholic Church defended, at the same time, the independence of the country and Polish statehood. World War II only reinforced this reputation. There were practically no collaborators among the clergy. On the contrary, many of them served as chaplains in the Polish forces in various parts of the world, others took part in the resistance, they joined partisan detachments, many of them went through prisons and concentration camps, and many died at the hands of the Hitlerites.

Thus the question which Soviet tourists frequently ask abroad ("Is this church used for worship?) does not apply to Poland. In Poland all churches are used for worship. What matters is something else: How are they being used? What message is being preached from the pulpits, what goes on under the protection of the church?

We will seek the answer to this question in Polish press reports on this subject. More than enough have accumulated of late. This too is significant. In the past there was no mention of this subject. The secular press wrote very rarely about church affairs. And as for saying something negative about a clergyman, casting doubt on his actions, or even criticizing him, was considered not so much impossible as inappropriate and improper, so to speak. The picture now is quite different. Things are being said, questions are being raised, and criticism is being voiced. And what is more, relatively often. It must mean that life itself commands it.

A writer in the weekly ZICIE LITERACKIE, a scientist specializing in chemistry, expressed himself very clearly on this account: "Take a phenomenon such as the onslaught of clericalism on our social life. What is needed is an open, principled debate which will teach society to distinguish between religion and clericalism, between preaching and politicking." Thus the onslaught of clericalism on social life and the politicking of a section of the clergy are phenomena which are causing concern in Polish society.

How do they manifest themselves? In constant and persistent attempts to interfere in all spheres of the Polish society's spiritual life, in efforts to set the tone in this sector, to present the church as the sole heir to the entire cultural legacy and the sole custodian of true morality. "Clericalism," TRYBUNA LUDU writes, "manifests itself... when the church tries to utilize public institutions, administrative organs, the state, or schools to achieve its own aims, when it tries to gain control of these institutions and with their help to foist its viewpoint on nonbelievers and representatives of other religious denominations, when the principles of freedom of conscience are breached."

The church is particularly sensitive about everything connected with influence on the young generation in Poland. Freedom of conscience does not come into it! The only concern is religious instruction, Catholic religious instruction, of course. In the current academic year a new subject--religious studies--has been introduced for the first time at 518 lyceums (high schools) on an experimental basis. It is to acquaint young people with the fundamentals of the scientific world outlook, explain to them the principles of state policy in respect of religion, and thus to instill in them tolerance of people with a different world outlook. In addition it is to teach them how to use the knowledge acquired to interpret religious phenomena and to take part in philosophical discussions.

This innovation is clearly not to the church's liking. The participants in the routine 214th episcopate conference expressed "serious alarm" in connection with the introduction of religious studies as a compulsory subject in the Polish school curriculum. PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, the organ of the Warsaw Curia, capped it all by launching into sharp attacks against a series of television movies on religious studies, stating bluntly that "19th-century rationalist optimism is dead and buried." No less! And for this reason the organ of the Curia exhorts its readership "to greet these movies with minimal public reaction and speedy oblivion..."

All this would be funny if it were not so serious. In the course of the debate which has unfolded on its pages, the newspaper POLITYKA published an article under the headline "The Secular School Is Not a School Where Atheism Is Preached." The author, incidentally, does not advocate religious instruction either. Excuse me, but if it is neither atheism nor religion, what does he advocate? There is no other option, it simply does not exist. It does, the author claims without batting an eye, and proposes (what do you think?) some kind of... world outlook representing their synthesis (!). He found it necessary to invent this "in order to avoid confrontation between religion and atheism in schools."

The militant section of the clergy, on the other hand, is not afraid of this confrontation, it has no intention of sidestepping it. It is literally spoiling for a fight. A recent service at the Warsaw Church of St. Stanislaw Kostka was turned into a political demonstration thanks to the efforts of its organizers and those taking part. In his sermon the parish priest accused the authorities of forcible atheization (?) of Polish society and hurled abuse at the leadership of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing for deliberately perverting the minds of young people (by introducing religious studies in schools--N.YE.) "with the help of an army of poorly trained propagandists" and of depriving young people of their faith.

An isolated incident? By no means. The weekly ARGUMENTY published an article in which it draws attention to the attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to extend to the Polish Scout Union its activities in brainwashing children and young people with religion. In recent months, ARGUMENTY writes, unusual symbols have appeared on the scouts' uniforms. The scout fleur-de-lis symbol superimposed on a cross, little icons of the Mother of God, and all kind of other badges which have nothing in common with the scout symbols and traditions. This is all the more surprising since there have been no such strange embellishments on the scout uniform throughout the entire 75 years of the union's existence.

The church is trying to get all sections of the young people under its influence. These activities have been stepped up noticeably in the course of preparations for the National Eucharist Congress of the Roman Catholic Church to be held next year. NIEDZIELA, the organ of the Czestochowa Curia, reports in this context that "special lectures and courses for parish school scripture teachers have already been held by the church." According to the weekly, their main aim is "to build a bond between children and the church."

Apart from churches, this kind of work is also carried out at special religious centers of a new type. The newspaper SLOWO POWSZECHNE, the organ of the Catholic laity, writes about a Christian Culture Center at Elblag. It houses several Catholic Church institutions under one roof. Family counseling for young people; a "confidential telephone advice service" for young unmarried mothers. Professional interests and different age groups are catered for. The "Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia" holds series of lectures and seminars for mass audiences, there is a "Catholic theater," a library, a cafe, an auditorium, and exhibition premises. All manner of courses, pilgrimages, and scripture lessons are organized for young people. There is a "Diocesan Institute of Christian Culture named for John Paul II."

This list alone makes it possible to form a picture of the very extensive, multifaceted, and very energetic activities of the church in Poland. Meanwhile a certain section of the clergy is constantly referring to the "persecution of the church," to the crown of thorns which it allegedly wears. Nothing is further from the truth than these claims. Here are just a few facts and figures. Large numbers of churches are being built in the country, although in terms of the number of parishioners there are already considerably more churches here than in other countries which are considered to be Catholic. For instance, while two churches were built in Nowa Huta, a district of Krakow, in the period since 1951, four more are being built simultaneously at the moment. The number of Catholic priests is decreasing with every passing year throughout the world. Only in Poland is it increasing. Last year there were 22,381 Catholic priests in Poland. One in three new priests in Europe is a Pole. What talk of persecution can there be?

The church feels no compunction in other spheres of activity either. The journal ZORZA depicts Roman Catholicism as "the main factor of the preservation of the Polish national character and national culture throughout the centuries." And if this does not correspond to the truth, too bad for truth. TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA carried out a detailed study of a book published by the Catholic publishing house under the title "Teaching About God" and caught the falsifiers in the act, so-to-speak. The aim of the book is to prove that only under the banner of the cross is Poland Poland and a Pole a Pole, that only if you are a Catholic can you be an eminent person or a scholar. And whom do the authors quote to corroborate this theory? The poetess Maria Konopnicka, whom the church has cursed and whose books it has boycotted. Juliusz Slowacki, whom they could not forgive the warning which rang out in one of his poems: "Poland! Your ruin lies in Rome!" And the prominent philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, who wrote that "there is no one god to take care of people. They are left to their own devices like everything that nature has created." These are just a few examples of juggling with famous names.

The militant churchmen's actions in the political arena, including the international arena, are especially aggressive and irresponsible. Here, too, their sympathies and antipathies are more than obvious, and their aims not difficult to work out. TRYBUNA LUDU has published a rejoinder in which it expresses puzzlement in connection with the publication by PRZELAD KATOLICKI of an interview with Z. Brzezinski. The newspaper recalls that the former U.S. presidential national security adviser was the author of the notorious plan for the destabilization of the situation in Poland.

And this is how the head of the Kielce Diocese assesses the present situation in Poland in his monthly: "We are living in an age where the people are threatened with the loss of their cultural and spiritual assets." These are crude insinuations which do not correspond to reality, ARGUMENTY writes. Incidentally, what is there to be surprised at if another bishop in another Catholic publication--NEIDZIELA--claims that "The main precondition for the unification of Europe is its return to its Christian roots." You could think that the authors of these statements cannot see beyond the church walls. But this is not the case. They accurately sense the pulse of a certain section of Polish society; they are not just pandering to the antisocialist forces but themselves frequently direct the latter's actions.

Who was it who in May picked up the subversive appeals of Radio Free Europe to organize "antisocialist" and "antigovernment" marches and demonstrations? Certain Catholic churches, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI notes. Who, speculating on the Chernobyl tragedy, tried to incite Polish public opinion to suit their own purposes? Once again it was the militant clericalists.

A prominent Polish journalist in an article entitled "Ballast" (I read it in TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA) cited many examples of irresponsible actions by the "agitators in the cassock" who, rather than preaching sermons, make malevolent political speeches from the pulpit. One of them publicly, in church, described the socialist system as the red devil and the source of all evil in Poland. Another one.... But enough.

It is much more important to find out what sort of attitude the leadership of the Polish Catholic Church, which claims that it favors dialogue with the government, has adopted to all these incidents. And here it is. "...This is a bad article (meaning "Ballast"--N.YE.)... A suggestion, or half a suggestion, taken out of context from a homily does not prove anything. And even if there were a certain bias expressing the sentiments of a certain section of society, it is surprising that so much significance is being attached to this."

However, public opinion on this account differs. "Most of society," TRYBUNA LUDU writes, "is tired of the displays of clericalism. There are many indications that the attempts at the total clericalization of Poland, the meddling by certain church leaders in social life (the imposition of a religious character and emblems on public institutions) are coming up against growing social opposition. Many public opinion polls indicate that an increasing number of citizens are adopting a critical attitude toward...the activities of the leadership of the Polish clergy, the imposition of numerous collections in favor of the church, fanaticism, and intolerance."

In an interview given to Hungarian television, W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, replying to a question about church-state relations, about the possibility of a historic compromise between them, said that if what is meant is a compromise affecting the social system or questioning its foundations, then at the philosophical, world-outlook level there can be no such compromise. "Regardless of this I am convinced," the Polish leader said, "that the preconditions for a normalization of church-state relations exist in Poland and that this normalization must be effected."

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EASTERN EUROPE

POLAND'S CURRENT SITUATION, PERIOD OF 1981 'EVENTS' COMPARED

PM121443 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 86 Morning Edition, 8 Dec 86 Morning Edition

[7 Dec 86 p 5]

[First article in series of two by special correspondent A. Druzenko under the rubric "Polish Notebook": "Five Years On"--capitalized passages between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] Moscow-Warsaw--The lights of multistory buildings. The fourth floor.. Apartment 410. A separate, small, two-room apartment, in brief, a completely ordinary apartment.

And an ordinary family. Jan, Elzbieta, and their son Ryszard. How tall he has become, that Rysiek! Quite an adult. It is just that he does not want to be an adult, Jan lets slip. Of course, Elzbieta interjects, he flunked his exams and you brought him his tape-recorder before the exams, didn't you? He took a deep breath, but agreed nevertheless. Oh, how time [vremya] flies! He used the Polish word "czas" [time], of course, and that made it sound even more convincing: Years have passed, but they seemed like hours... ["czas" is a homophone of the Russian for "hour"]

What is life like for them, my dear friends? Jan, who even before the well known events was extremely critical of everything going on around him, does not want to get involved in anything. He works for the Polski Związek Motorwy [Polish automobile association], drives around Warsaw in a PZM car, and gives driving lessons to those who want to learn. And there is a whole host of them. "The phone never stops ringing," Elzbieta remarks.

"What is life like?" Elzbieta repeats. "You can see yourself how everything has changed. Five years ago--you remember what it was like? But now... Have you seen the stores? Well, what did you think? They have everything, don't they? But it is expensive..."

They did not leave me to make my own way to the hotel but accompanied me there--right up the revolving doors of the Hotel Europejski. The next morning I went to the Interpress press center, which I remembered so well from my years as IZVESTIYA own correspondent, sat down as before with colleagues and friends over a cup of coffee, exchanged news (and their interest in "what

news is there from Moscow?" was no less than my own interest in "what news is there from Warsaw?"), took a folder of news reports, and began reading.

The news was /CALM./ Life was taking its natural course. The events mentioned in the bulletins were, admittedly, not earth-shattering but by their whole tone seemed to attest to calm.

One million metric tons of coal had been dug at the Bogdanka mine (I was there 9 years ago--they were only just beginning to build it then). Slowly but surely Poles are assimilating the new Lublin-Chelm coalfield in the east of the country. The "Diora" radio plant in Dzierzonow has begun producing video recorders programmable for up to 2 weeks in advance. An all-Polish exhibition of inventions has been held in Katowice. The traditional chamber music festival held in the magnificent (and I can vouch for that) Lancut Palace became an international one this year for the first time. The popularity of (maybe it's a fashion?) acupuncture is growing: The country's 20th consultancy using this method has opened in Walbrzych....

Thus summer 1986 in Poland was uneventful and uncomplicated. And there no longer seems to be any reminder of the events which overwhelmed the country 5 years ago. Scarcely had I begun thinking that than my eyes fell on a report which immediately took me back to... Poland.

The report was about the increase in the membership of the new trade unions, the fact that around 60 percent of workers now belong to them, and that the number of major enterprises where trade unions have not yet been created is now just 6 percent. This report provides food for thought. And a rapid succession of questions. How can it be that more than 1,000 enterprises have no trade union organizations at all and yet that is considered an achievement?

There are many things in Poland which still give rise to questions, particularly for the /NEWCOMER./ Often they are puzzling questions. Even more often they are naive. They cannot be answered without looking back 5 years to those events which were called the "Polish" events. They were deeply rooted in the economy, the social structures, social life, even morals.

The orientation of the country's former leadership toward Western credits and licenses, which were seen as an artificial stimulant capable of moving the economy forward, in the late seventies had the effect of causing production volumes first to stagnate and then to fall.

That, of course, was bound to affect the population's living standard. And it was people employed in the state industrial sector, above all workers, who most bore the brunt of the economic disorders. They were the ones whose lives deteriorated day by day, particularly in comparison with other sections of the population--peasants, the well-to-do ones, of course, craftsmen, owners of private workshops and stores, and self-employed representatives of the intelligentsia. This, in fact, also contains the answer to the question which, as I recall, caused most bewilderment at that time: Why was it the collectives of major industrial enterprises--shipyards, metallurgical and machine building plants, and mines--which joined so actively in the events during the first stage?

The party of the working class was losing its influence among the masses. It was growing in size but the formal character of that growth ultimately turned into grave problems and losses. They were aggravated by the fact that party leaders--both at the center and at local level--were increasingly infected by the bug of "bourgeoisification" and that nepotism, corruption, and communist arrogance flourished. The very concepts of values and ideas became deformed: The consumerist approach to life became the everyday moral norm. From rostrums functionaries spouted about the leading, vanguard role of the working class and about equality and justice but in everyday life they showed a blatant passion for worldly goods, which were often undeserved: Villas, Mercedes cars, and foreign trips for house guests [domochadets] were symbols of success and prosperity.

Particular mention should be made of the weakness of the extremely bureaucratic trade union movement. Its paid officials in production were "under the thumb" of the administration and showed glaring passivity when it came to defending working people's interests.

Finally, the window dressing which dominated the mass media's activity had an extremely adverse effect on the mood of the masses. People saw that matters were deteriorating, felt the disruptions in rhythm in their own production unit, stood in long waiting lines, were alarmed by rising prices, yet on returning home in the evening heard on television cheerful words about the latest heights scaled in "building the second Poland."

The discrepancy between reality and its depiction cut to the quick.

"The propaganda of success"--the name that was given to that practice--excluded genuine openness from life. People were not told the truth and the emerging difficulties were not explained with full frankness. People were not consulted on how to overcome those difficulties. Glaring instances of social injustice were not removed in the open, for all to see. Thus the ground was prepared for protest.

I recall the summer and fall of 1981.... Now, with hindsight, from a different perspective, the conclusion that "Poland was on the brink of national catastrophe" seems a historical fact, one which is also perceived in somewhat abstract terms as something relegated to the realms of theory. But you, the eyewitness, only need to think back and....

...you see the legendary Starowka [Warsaw old city] not filled with contented lines of tourists but with a dense, nervous throng shrouded in smoke and cordoned off by ranks of militiamen. And the Lazienki Palace seemed suspiciously deserted--it was quite unsafe to stroll along its avenues in the evenings. And I suddenly remembered my conversation with Elzbieta and Jan as we searched frantically in the backstreets of our block searching for our sons who had gone missing, and we could not get out of our heads what a Hungarian colleague had said about how "Solidarity" extremists had decided to frighten journalists from the socialist countries accredited in Warsaw by kidnapping their children.

The alarming, turbulent, shocking year of 1981 was an upheaval for everyone. Disorder was in the order of things.

Strikes turned into a kind of seemingly incurable mass hysteria. People used any pretext to strike, including the pretext of the lack of a pretext.

A friend with a tendency to categorize and systematize everything estimated how many types of strikes were current at that time. I think he came up with two dozen. Warning strikes, partial strikes, regional strikes, sit-down strikes, roving strikes, sit-ins, readers' strikes (when the newspapers and journals were boycotted), and so forth. People went on strike senselessly, not realizing that a nation which does not work does not produce national income. With all the attendant consequences of that.

And the consequences were already facing the ordinary people in the form of empty shelves in the stores. There were waiting lines for everything. Ration cards for everything. One bar of soap per month was the norm. If you could buy matches you were lucky....

The statistics sounded the alarm: The production of all goods without exception was falling.

Skillfully playing on people's feelings, "Solidarity's" leaders cranked the protest "machine" up to full speed. It must be said that the sermons of some extremist church officials, presenting socialism as the progeny [as published] of all evils and misfortunes, added fuel to the flames. There were "hunger marches" by women from Lodz and Gdansk. Thousands of buses and trucks were massed in the center of Warsaw, paralyzing traffic in the city. And a blizzard of leaflets descended on the cities and villages containing calls to put an end to socialism and threats to communists, for whom the "final battle" was said to have begun.

The furious attacks on the militia and law enforcement organs on the one hand and, on the other, the outright incitement to flout the laws and careful sheltering of recidivists who had escaped from prison generated an atmosphere of fear. People were simply afraid--to go out into the street, to talk with passersby, or to turn to a militiaman.

In the initial stage the counterrevolution's strategy was to destroy and undermine of the vital foundations of the state and society. Even though Lech Walesa spouted from public platforms about the intention to transform Poland into a... "second Japan." I recall the reader of a weekly who, thinking of the endless succession of strikes, reminded the newfound figure not unhumorously that the Japanese did not begin the leap forward in the development of their economy and technology by committing hara-kiri.

The strike fever turned into everyday anarchy, which in turn led to total license.

That total license shook the state mechanism. Well, you will say, how can institutions function normally when any of them may be visited by activists from the new "trade union association" equipped with rucksacks, sleeping bags, and provisions who announce that such and such an institution is being closed and that its premises are being "occupied" by strikers?

That total license turned into an open attack on the party of the working class. I remember how at the "Ponar" plant in Zywiec, local representatives of the Social Self-defense Committee-Workers Defense Committee [KSS-KOR] issued a demand... to disband the plant's PZPR organization. And even more malevolently they advised party activists to preach their ideology in their own homes.

That total license whipped up a wave of anti-Sovietism. How I wanted at that time to describe in full detail the case in which some young people desecrated the grave of Colonel Skopenko, that selfsame colonel who refused to bombard Sandomierz during the city's liberation and thus saved it from destruction! I had to restrain myself....

The crisis shook relations and communication between people to the core. In collectives, families, and in everyday life. And talk of a possible civil war seemed no exaggeration at all.

In one newspaper at that time I read an article about a peasant and his own sons. The older one had been elected a delegate to the extraordinary Ninth PZPR Congress, the younger a delegate to the "Solidarity" Congress. Just like a situation from Sholokhov's early stories, isn't it?

And now, returning from Poland, I hear different people asking the same question. Well, how is it over there? And the answer, if one is possible, can only come from a comparison. It is necessary to have a clear picture of the tragedy that affected Polish lives in late 1981 and against that background assess how far that life now, 5 years on, is returning to its normal course like a river after a disastrous flood.

And it is returning to its normal course. That is plain to see. Production at plants and factories goes on. There are plenty of problems but people do not see strikes as the means of solving them. The store windows and shelves are not empty. Everything is there--produce and goods. But, as Pani Elzbieta said, they are expensive. It is true that wages are rising at the same time--that is a characteristic of the economic reform that is in progress. Ration cards have been abolished. Only certain meat products remained rationed and the restrictions on them are going to be lifted.

On the city streets, as usual, there are posters and announcements--for movies, exhibitions, soccer matches, the "Toto" lottery draw results, and accommodation exchanges. But there are none of the leaflets calling for an end to socialism which were literally everywhere in that crisis summer.

Law and order have been restored. Or more accurately, the awareness of law and order. People know that public order is being protected and that anyone who infringes it will answer to the law.

The path traveled by the country was assessed by Polish communists at their forum. The 10th PZPR Congress stated that considerable progress had been achieved in eliminating the consequences of the political, social, and economic crisis in which Poland found itself in the late seventies and early eighties.

That conclusion accords with life. And my impressions, which lay no claim to profundity, as an eyewitness comparing present-day Poland with what happened in the country 5 years ago consist of just a few words: The time is completely /DIFFERENT/.

Of course, this does not mean that the crisis is over and forgotten, that there are no problems, and that unanimity and accord reign everywhere. Just take that report on the new trade unions. After all that had happened, they virtually had to be reborn. To expect everyone to instantly see the light, to rid themselves of doubts, and to fall into line behind the new organization is, to say the least, naive. But one cannot fail to see the progress: The role of the new trade unions in social and economic life and in its further democratization is increasing, as the congress of the revived Polish trade unions which ended recently in Warsaw confirmed, by the way.

The only area perhaps in which there have been no tangible changes in the past 5 years is in the stance adopted by the powers-that-be in the West, particularly in the United States, with regard to the way that the situation has developed in Poland since that memorable December night. The same old frenzy of aggressive propaganda, the same old attempts to interfere in the Poles' internal affairs. And a fresh fact: On the initiative of the leadership of the U.S. AFL-CIO, whose views are well known, two splittist trade unions centers--the ICFTU and the World Confederation of Labor--simultaneously announced from their Brussels headquarters the admission to their ranks of... the nonexistent "Solidarity."

...When meeting with Poles, I noticed that in conversation most people only look back reluctantly to the events of 5 years ago. It is hard to say why. I can only surmise. Is that not what happens with someone who has experienced a personal drama and, perhaps, more than just one? You will agree that usually people do not like to dwell on that kind of thing....

And there is another detail: They do not avoid talking about the double-edged topic of the imposition of martial law in December 1981. How many anxious, uncertain, frightened, panicky, forlorn, and desperate people there were, how many utterly gloomy predictions were heard, how many curses rent the air! Now, when people assess this extreme measure they understand better what it brought them and, most important, /WHAT/ it saved them from. And many people acknowledge: There was no other way out.

[8 Dec 86 p 3]

[Second and final part of special correspondent A. Druzenko series under the rubric "Polish Notebook": "Five Years On"]

[Text] Moscow-Warsaw—I "computed" the hero of these lines--Marek Pietruszka, a machine operator at the Laziska heat and power station 20 km from Katowice--without knowing of his existence.

This is how it happened. I was to make a trip from Warsaw to the south of the country. I asked if a talk could be arranged with someone whose life had contained the following episodes, shall we say: During the events he left the PZPR and became an active "Solidarity" member, but has now rejoined the party. And so it was that I found myself sitting in the party committee office of the Laziska heat and power station asking Marek Pietruszka about his life.

A lean, ascetic looking, 27-year-old with brown hair, at first he kept repeating that he had no idea what to say, and in response to my cheery remark that "everything will be fine" he immediately observed that never in his life before had he spoken to a Polish journalist, let alone a foreign one. To be frank, I myself was not quite sure how to handle the conversation. I could not say "point-blank": Come on then, tell me how you voluntarily left the party and then asked to be taken back again. But eventually the conversation gradually began to take shape.

"I have not been working very long here, at the power station," Marek told me. "Only 3 years. Before that I worked at a mine as an assistant signalman.... When there were strikes at the mine in 1981 I also took part in them. Although, to be honest, I could see that people did not have a clear idea of what they wanted. In that case why go on strike? It is easy now, you know, to say what one should have done, but then.... Then I acted as the majority did. Going against the majority, especially if you worked with these people, was not so simple. Not everyone could do it.... It was the same with the party. No, I was not expelled. I myself went to the party committee, filled in the form, and handed it in to the secretary. My party card too. How did he react? He didn't. He took it and turned away..."

However strange this may seem, as I listened to Marek, it was not the troubled days of the crisis that I remembered but the time preceding it. I remembered how here, in Katowice, on the giant stage of the famous Palace of Sport, which resembles a flying saucer, high-ranking functionaries walked along the rows of people, presenting them with their party cards.

What kind of individual work with recruits could there be back then in the seventies, when people were not so much admitted as inducted to the party? Plans were sent out from the center and those at local level pledged to overfulfill them. Parishes, cities, and voivodships tried to outdo one another in "recruitment." As a result, by the end of the decade the party had approximately 3.5 million members.

At that time the country had a population of 35 million. Consequently, one person in ten was a communist. But the question is: What kind of communist? Really a communist? Or a communist in name only?

On this occasion too formalism proved brilliantly that quantity without quality ultimately ceases even to be quantity.

I remember how, at the height of the events, at some enterprises and institutions, "Solidarity" members put special boxes labeled "for party cards" in prominent places, without asking permission from anyone, as if to mock or, perhaps, to emphasize their influence and sway people. And what happened? People came up and publicly dropped their cards in. And do you know who these people mainly were? Those very same "recruits" of recent years, admitted to the party in the drive for mass "involvement."

But I shall return to my conversation with Marek Pietruszka. Remember his words-- "to go against the majority." A great deal lies behind these words. At that time a person often made decisions not only of his own accord or, if you like, in private. General feeling also brought pressure to bear. Very great pressure.

And there is yet another subtle point here. You notice that my interlocutor stressed that he himself went to the party committee and himself handed in his application and membership card. That is, he was not expelled from the party for antiparty activity. There are various degrees of guilt here. It is one thing to waver, another to become an opponent.

"And what happened next?" I asked Marek.

"Next? I believed in 'Solidarity.' Here is a new trade union, I thought, with so many fine words, promises, and slogans.... But then my enthusiasm began to wane. I wanted to become involved in trade union work, you see, but there was none. Wherever you looked, it all came down to the same thing--politics and power, power and politics. And, like others, I found myself at a loss. All around was now total hysteria. Then martial law was introduced. And what would have happened otherwise? Brother would have attacked brother..."

"And what happened here, at the power station?"

"I worked at the mine until 1983. Though I felt, you know... I decided to leave. I found a job at the power station. I was given a good reception, even promised accommodation. I generally wanted to... make a new start somehow."

"And rejoin the party?"

"I understand what you mean. I was asked the same thing at the meeting. Although all this is not as simple as it may appear.... I could see that much was changing in the party. Less talk and more action, which is as it should be. But, on the other hand, how could I go back? I had, after all, left of my own accord. Okay, I had not done anything particularly wrong, I was not an

extremist, but I had lacked firmness, the guilt remained... I thought about this for a long time. Then I went to see the party committee secretary anyway, here at the power station, and asked him what view he and others would take. They probably found out about me at the mine, discussed me among themselves, and, in short, decided that I could rejoin..."

Again I foresee incomprehension, perhaps even indignation: How can this be, you will say, someone has left the party of his own accord, now wants to rejoin, and is actually admitted? However, at that time in Poland, at the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, there were many people like Marek Pietruszka, confused, having lost their faith in justice, and deceived by political adventurers. And here is what should be particularly stressed: The majority of these people were not against socialism--they simply refused to accept **/DISTORTIONS/** [capitalized words between slantlines published in boldface] of socialism.

Incidentally, it was precisely the fact that they refused to accept these distortions that was skillfully exploited by opposition figures.

...I remember a trip to Poznan in fall 1980. We found ourselves at a machine building plant there after the first stormy meetings. A reporter from the plant newspaper told us about one of these meetings:

"The meeting was held in the assembly shop. To say people were excited would be an understatement. Someone from the administration tried to speak, so did someone from the party committee--but they would not let them. They were whistled down. I suppose one can understand why. People were tired of empty slogans. What did they want? Straight talk. About prices and shortages. About wages. About why some people who did not deserve to have easy lives. It was in this kind of atmosphere that a certain someone mounted the rostrum. Some people seemed to know him, to others he was a complete stranger, people were asking who he was, where he came from. Although, you see, after the meeting he was elected chief of the plant's "Solidarity" group. And what did he have to say? Virtually nothing. Here you are, he said, here is a copy of a document. Take a look at it, I will wait. What was this document? It turned out to be the will of a scientist who was well known in Poznan. And, as it transpired, before he died he bequeathed his villa to a kindergarten. 'Have you read it?' the person standing on the rostrum asked. 'Now read another document.' This document made it clear that there was no kindergarten in the villa. The daughter of the voivodship committee secretary was living there..."

Any injustice, bribery, arrogance, or corruption arouses a natural sense of indignation in any normal person. Especially if that person has been educated in the spirit of socialist ideals. Now such people were being showered with cases of all this--but not for the purpose of strengthening socialism and cleansing it of distortions but rather to gradually "transform" protest against cases like these into protest against socialism.

This kind of "playing" on feelings succeeded, particularly at first. Otherwise, millions of people would not have rushed to join "Solidarity." What is surprising about this? It was guarding justice, showing concern for the workers, demanding higher wages and two days off....

It took time to realize that all the talk of social justice was only a lure, that the "concern" for wages, which manifested itself in the strike madness, led to economic paralysis, and that the "trade union association" merely served as a screen for an open struggle for power.

It was not easy to discern all this. For many, like Marek Pietruszka, this insight was a personal drama....

One can, of course, question the degree of sincerity of such people: both then and now. In my opinion, an unequivocal conclusion is impossible here. This is because every such /RETURN/ is a strictly individual matter. Just as the approach to everyone who joins the PZPR today is individual.

...The ashtray was overflowing with cigarette ends, but my conversation with Marek continued.

As I listened I thought that to be a member of the ruling party in Poland today is no privilege. This decision often entails in Poland today is no privilege. This decision often entails psychological discomfort. And a choice. The majority of people now joining the party do so not because they see it as a springboard to success, a career, and prosperity, but because they regard it as their opportunity to openly express their beliefs in an organized way, beliefs that are perhaps different, radically different from those of their neighbors, acquaintances, friends, and relatives.

This clarity (either-or), this bald choice has also predetermined changes in internal party life--in favor of greater democracy and stronger ties with the "grassroots." These changes allowed Wojciech Jaruzelski to draw an only at first seemingly paradoxical conclusion in one of his speeches: Today the party is the same, but different.

I keep wondering what a chance remark is worth, even if you listen to everything with the heightened attention of someone who has been away for a long time. Is it possible from a few words--uttered by long-standing acquaintances or, conversely, by people seen for the first time--to judge moods which, even if you cannot define them, you at least want to capture?

Hardly, I'm sure. Too much is pure chance. And mutually exclusive.... But perhaps the truth can be captured at the point where the opposites meet?

When I said goodbye to Marek Pietruszka I heard him say: "Do you know what will decide things? How we work. It is as clear as daylight..."

And here is another opinion I heard during a totally informal conversation at table. I was sitting next to someone called Krzysztof, a healthy, happy person who provocatively introduced himself as "a colleague of yours in the past, but now an ordinary Polish capitalist."

About 20 years ago he began work on a party newspaper's picture desk. He came into conflict with someone in the editorial secretariat, took his Leica, and went to work for a Catholic newspaper instead. But even there he did not get on with his bosses. And the monotony of the subjects bored him too, he admitted. And they did not pay him enough, alas. And then an opportunity arose. A cousin of his was opening up a business and looking for partners. The business was both simple and lucrative: printing various motifs on shirts, blouses, footballs, and so forth. The money increased but so did the work. "I'm on the go nonstop," Krzysztof complained.

As we were saying goodbye he launched into the subject of politics:

"We will never have tranquillity. In another 2, 3, or 4 years it will all start up again. We Poles cannot live without crises."

Two opinions, and between them.... One says: If we work, everything will be fine. The other works, runs around in circles, and believes there will be a crisis.

Who is right? Whose prediction is closest to the truth?

When I was in Warsaw in the summer I read an interesting article in the weekly PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY by the journalist Joanna Skoczylas. Analyzing the Polish mood in the first half of 1986, she claims that the domestic policy issues which aroused so much emotion 5 years ago are today regarded far more coolly and reasonably. People's attention has noticeably shifted toward the economy. "It can be said without exaggeration," the journalist writes, "that Polish homes are undergoing a kind of economic education on a hitherto unparalleled scale. Even the issues which have traditionally been considered most important in the family—children, education, health, work, not to mention ordinary gossip—have given way to such problems as the state of the economy and living standards."

Does this mean that people are no longer interested in politics?

No, but they are not interested to the same degree, for one thing, and for another, their interest is less fervent. In my opinion this is shown by data from the National Center for the Study of Public Opinion, which, incidentally, has shown great versatility in recent years. The results of a poll of former "Solidarity" members are particularly interesting. It shows their attitude to the authorities' initiatives and decisions. Full approval was expressed by 3.1 percent of those questioned (to my mind the result confirms the objectivity of the research). Far greater attention is drawn by another section of the poll—"I agree with current policy." Here an affirmative answer was given by 42.1 percent. A critical (but not negative) attitude to the authorities' initiatives was expressed by 21.8 percent of those polled, while 2.8 percent totally rejected them.

I believe this circumstance largely determined a government decision which aroused a broad response both inside the country and outside. I am talking about the amnesty in fall 1986 of everyone either imprisoned or under investigation for antistate activities. Many commentaries regard this measure as a sign of the authorities' strength, which is in keeping with the facts. Another factor must also be highlighted: the waning authority of the opposition.

Different opinions are expressed on this score, however. But two questions nevertheless come to the fore. Can former "Solidarity" leaders be loyal at all? Is there not a danger of underestimating their influence on the development of the situation today?

In mid-October GAZETA KRAKOWSKA published an interview with Wladyslaw Lisiak, a former member of the illegal "Solidarity" structures who decided to leave the underground and break with the past:

"It was a difficult decision. It took a long time to reach it, after much doubt and hesitation. I understand, of course, that I am severing all ties with 'Solidarity,' to which I have devoted so many years. But I also understand something else: There is no sense in continuing to work underground. I would like an ordinary life, free from fear and stress. At one time I believed in Lech Walesa's sincere intentions. But later, when I was underground, I became convinced that he had been made a puppet. He surrounded himself with people pursuing exactly the same political interests as himself. The workers, trade unions--all this was a screen. It is still the same now."

At about this time Radio Free Europe broadcast an interview with the notorious Zbigniew Bujak. Distinguished by his inordinate extremism during the events of 1980-1981, after the introduction of martial law he became the leader of the entire illegal "Solidarity" organization. It is noteworthy that his arrest in spring 1986 did not cause any particular intellectual ferment. The "hero" was even shown on television--and he made no impression.

Now, free again, Bujak willingly paints a vivid picture of his prospects for the future. You cannot deny that he is frank. He was asked: Why do you avoid the ordinary concerns of the working people in your activity? His reply: Well, you see, you have to know a lot in order to resolve labor and wages issues and social problems generally, but the main thing is you have to engage in ordinary, everyday work. He cannot do this. He is a political figure, you see, who knows only one way--struggle and strikes. That is, he was an adventurer and still is.

Two former "illegals," two interviews, two opinions. I do not rule out the possibility that the motives given by the first--"I want an ordinary life"--are shared by many ordinary representatives of the opposition. Time is both a teacher and healer. But as far as the leaders are concerned, it is my opinion that no medicine is capable of having any effect. In fact, this is what the "hero" of the underground said, making no attempt to be diplomatic. True, his other comrades-in-arms are not so frank. Many, including Walesa, maneuver, trying to find a place in sociopolitical life as they did in fall 1980, and come up with various proposals in which they supposedly extend a hand to the authorities to cooperate with them in overcoming difficulties (as if they themselves had nothing to do with creating them).

...Once, in 1979, I had quite a frank conversation with the secretary of the PZPR Central Committee responsible for ideology at that time. I remember how a question about his attitude to the activities of various dissidents--Kuron, Michnik, Modzelewski, and others--grated on him. Our interlocutor waved his hand as if brushing aside something trivial but importunate, and then he replied in the same spirit: Really, comrades, why overestimate a mere handful of retrogrades, we know them all well, we can count them on the fingers of one hand, why draw attention to them and publicize them, and really, what is there to be afraid of?

In under 1 year Gdansk saw its first strike. There, at the shipyard, the same Kuron, Michnik, and Modzelewski were the ones advising the workers. The Social Self-Defense Committee and Workers Defense Committee had begun its work among the masses. How it all ended is well known.

....In the plane to Moscow I was leafing through my notebook when an elegant gold visiting card suddenly slipped out:

"Doctor Rudolf Maron, general director of 'Centrostal,' Katowice, Stalowa Street..."

The frenzied Rudolf had managed to tell me everything about his beloved "Centrostal" in the course of an afternoon. The most striking thing was that, 5 years ago, there was no "Solidarity" at their enterprise.

But literally across the street was the "Wujek" mine, famous throughout Poland for its protest actions, the neighborhood was full of leaflets and red and white armbands, everywhere feelings ran high, but here, at the "Centrostal," they continued to work as if nothing was happening.

To my natural question of "why?" Maron replied, flexing his fingers: "One, people were satisfied with their wages; two, everyone valued their work place; three, good workers were respected; four, there were virtually no waiting lists for housing; five, kindergarten facilities were provided in full; six, you could go on holiday at a sanatorium in the mountains or a sanatorium on the Baltic; seven, the collective resolved its own conflicts; is that enough?"

As we were saying goodbye Rudolf said:

"Do you know what we need most of all? Vigilance."

...And so, back home again, I hear, as I did 5 years ago, the familiar question: Well, how are things there?

How difficult it is to reply! And to give the kind of reply expected: short and succinct.

Several years ago, Paris KULTURA, an openly antisocialist Polish emigre publication, quoted a dispatch of mine from Warsaw as an example of nonsense. My words regarding the situation in the country--"the complex stabilization process

continues"--appeared meaningless to the experts there. The stylists from KULTURA evidently suppose that stabilization is something that has happened, that is complete, and consequently either is or is not.

But I am prepared to say exactly the same thing now.

The stabilization process continues.

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LATIN AMERICA INCLUDED IN USSR'S PACIFIC SECURITY PROPOSAL

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[Editorial: "The Region's New Prospects in World Politics"]

[Text] The course of contemporary world events is an extremely complex and deeply contradictory process, distinguished by the severity of dangerous crisis situations and by objective changes connected largely with the increasing sense of responsibility on the part of people in developing countries for the fate and future of mankind. It was no coincidence that when Gabriel Garcia Marquez addressed the latest forum of the "Delhi Six" in the Mexican city of Ixtapa on the 41st anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedy, he expressed the feelings of millions of other Latin Americans when he said that "the only thing that can save us from barbarism is the culture of peace." It would be absurd and criminal to live by the old and already dead rules of international relations in the face of the nuclear threat.

The search for ways of developing a new manner of political thinking in line with the interests and desires of the people of all countries and continents was given unprecedented momentum by the foreign policy initiatives of the 27th CPSU Congress and the ideas and practical suggestions M. S. Gorbachev set forth in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. The speech presented here was an integral theory of interrelated measures to turn the Pacific basin, which represents almost half of the world, into a zone of peace and mutually beneficial cooperation and an important element of a comprehensive system of international security.

The constructive nature of this approach to problems with equally acute effects in Asia, America and Australia has aroused great interest in the Latin American states and has given their foreign policy initiatives strong momentum. It is understandable that the development of a new manner of political thinking and a new political culture of peace will also give this region new opportunities for a more important role in world politics as a continent with a Pacific and an Atlantic coast. This process could multiply Latin America's peaceful potential and increase its contribution to the struggle for the survival of humanity and for a new and just system of international relations. For example, there is the Tlatelolco Treaty. Today its ideas have been embraced by 13 countries in the South Pacific Forum (SPF). The document they adopted on 11 August 1986 forever prohibits the deployment,

production and testing of nuclear weapons in this vast zone. Papers accompanying the treaty, addressed specifically to the United States, England and France, which control territories in the Pacific, asked them to observe the non-nuclear principles in this part of the world. The SPF countries have taken a major step of more than regional significance--the real prospect of turning the entire southern hemisphere into a nuclear-free zone has come into being.

This prospect could be secured through the implementation of the principles set forth in the Soviet idea of a comprehensive system of international security, primarily respect for the interests and rights of each nation and active participation by all states in the creation of a new international order. Increasing awareness of the importance of these principles was displayed at the last meeting of the "Delhi Six," where several leaders of developing countries mentioned the need to link problems in national development closely with efforts to consolidate peace. This spirit permeates the "Mexican Declaration," which was adopted by the forum and contains an entire series of constructive measures to stop the arms race on earth and in outer space and to aid the "Delhi Six" in the resolution of this urgent worldwide problem.

The same issues were discussed at the 17th Socintern Congress, the first to be held in Latin America (in Lima), in which the social democrats of the developing world took an active part. The main resolution of the congress, the Lima Manifesto, contains an urgent appeal to the U.S. Government to change its negative position on the total and universal nuclear test ban.

Wherever the defense of peace has become an important international cause in spite of imperialist intrigues, favorable prerequisites are being established for the improvement of the international climate. This is why Latin America's new role in today's world has so much potential. In a speech on Soviet television on 18 August 1986, M. S. Gorbachev mentioned the significance of this potential for the future of mankind. "However important and meaningful our proposals might be, however committed we might be to them," he stressed, "we realize that we cannot do everything by ourselves. The problem of international security is a common problem and, therefore, a common concern and a common responsibility." Choosing this course is the same as passing a historic test of maturity and accomplishing an important international mission.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

PROGRESS, FUTURE TASKS SUMMED UP AT CUBAN III PARTY CONGRESS

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[Article by V. N. Lunin: "Cuba: Advancing to New Frontiers of Socialist Construction"]

[Text] The Third Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) was held in Havana at the beginning of February 1986. It is known to have been attended by around 1,800 delegates. Envoys from 196 communist, workers', national-democratic and socialist parties and from a variety of progressive organizations throughout the world attended the congress as guests.

The congress agenda covered a broad range of topics: the discussion of the Central Committee report, presented by Fidel Castro, the ratification of the Basic Guidelines of Cuba's Socioeconomic Development in 1986-1990, the adoption of some charter amendments and the approval of the draft program of the PCC and several resolutions. The congress also elected new party central administrative organs.

Foundation for Progress

The third congress concentrated on key areas of socialist construction, primarily the completion of the material and technical base of the new society. The main objective of current economic strategy is the acceleration of the industrialization process and the creation of the optimal national economic structure with a view to the distinctive development of the country, the supply of natural resources and specialization within the framework of socialist division of labor.

The report of the Central Committee described the development of the society in the last 5 years in detail. For example, the gross social product increased by an average of 7.3 percent a year, which was much higher than the planned 5 percent, and the industrial product increased by an average of 8.8 percent a year. Furthermore, labor productivity rose by an average of 5.2 percent a year and accounted for 74 percent of production growth. The Cuban people's achievements are particularly impressive in light of the aggravation of Latin America's socioeconomic problems in the first half of the 1980's. It is indicative that all of the Latin American countries, including the largest, Brazil and Mexico, lagged far behind socialist Cuba in the growth rate of

economic potential. Besides this, negative per capita GDP growth was recorded in all of the countries of the region with the exception of Cuba, and the total decrease in Latin America's per capita GDP was 8.9 percent for the 5 years.

There were also major changes in the very structure of the Cuban economy. The sugar industry is known to be its leading sector. The increasing integration of the Cuban economy into the CEMA framework, where the decisive factor is the work on long-term special programs of cooperation, including the comprehensive development of sugar production, has allowed Cuba to plan and increase sugar production confidently, seek the optimal uses for facilities and develop not only the main production branches, but also have the prospect of an increase in the by-products of sugar cane refining.

Radical changes connected with the rapid rise of the level of mechanization, which reached 62 percent by the end of the 5 years, have taken place in this sector. Whereas 350,000 people were cutting cane in 1970, the figure had dropped to 72,000 by 1985; furthermore, it was reduced by almost half in the last 5 years. There was an increase of 12.2 percent in the sugar output. Industrial enterprises manufacturing equipment for sugar production simultaneously doubled their output. It is also indicative that the number of specialists with degrees is constantly rising in agroindustrial complexes.

The Cuban communists, however, are certainly not idealizing these achievements. Unutilized opportunities for the development of sugar production were revealed at the congress. Objectives were set to increase the yield of sugar cane, encourage the extensive use of the progressive standards of agricultural technology, etc. Speakers directed special attention to the need to increase the by-products of sugar refining, especially livestock feeds, furfural, bagasse cakes and others.

Other branches of agriculture were also developed substantially. Their average annual growth rate was 3.8 percent. The increase in output over the 5 years was 21 percent for milk, 23 percent for eggs, 30 percent for poultry meat, 33 percent for pork, 23 percent for feeds, 29.2 percent for feed tubers, 48.6 percent for vegetables, 24 percent for tobacco, 16 percent for coffee and 27 percent for cacao. The output of one of the most important export crops, citrus fruits, doubled over the 5 years. The chemical industry played an important role in enhancing the productivity of agriculture by increasing the output of compound fertilizers by 18 percent and of nitrogen fertilizers by 56 percent. The supply of technical equipment in agriculture also increased substantially. For example, there was an increase of 10 percent in the total number of tractors between 1981 and 1985, and of 42 percent in their combined power. There was an increase of 25 percent in the country's irrigated land, which now covers an area of half a million hectares.

In the last 5 years there were also major changes in industry. It is indicative that machine building, an important branch of the Cuban economy, developed at a high and steady rate of around 16 percent a year. At the end of the 5 years the production of electronic components was mastered when the semiconductor plant in Pinar del Rio was opened. There was an increase of 86 percent in the output of radios and of 94 percent in the output of television sets.

The output of spare parts was triple the 1981 output, and now satisfies 45 percent of the demand for them in the country. The output of light industry increased by an average of 8.8 percent a year. The output of fabric over the 5 years totaled 870 million square meters and was 15 percent greater than the output of the previous 5 years. There was an increase of 30 percent in the output of yarn.

Construction displayed dynamic development and an average annual growth rate of 9.5 percent. The volume of industrial construction increased by 45 percent from 1981 to 1985. The hundreds of construction projects completed in the last 5 years included the agricultural implement plant in Holguin, a large knitting mill, the mechanical plant of the nickel combine, an offset paper combine, the textile combine in Santiago de Cuba, the second section of the Antillana de Azero metallurgical plant and several new sugar refineries.

At the same time, congress delegates resolutely revealed existing shortcomings in the development of industry and construction. They include the insufficient use of capacities, the failure to observe technological discipline, the insufficient use of construction and transportation equipment, the violation of major construction project deadlines, the increasing number of unfinished construction projects, etc.

Several important measures were taken in Cuba in the last 5 years to surmount difficulties in economic and social development. These resulted in the more successful conservation of resources, mastery of new technology and satisfaction of national demand with domestic production. In particular, proportionate fuel expenditures were reduced from 275.3 grams per kilowatt-hour in 1980 to 260 in 1985, which represented a savings of 460,000 tons of fuel. The use of oil in unrefined sugar production gradually stopped, producing a savings of 1.709 billion tons of oil over the 5 years. A national program for the efficient use of energy was drawn up in line with the policy of energy conservation. The amount of petroleum products used as fuel in Cuba in 1990 should be 10 percent lower than in 1985.

The incorporation of advanced scientific and technical achievements is an important way of transferring the national economy to the channel of intensive development. As congress speakers noted, 39,000 people are employed in the sphere of scientific research. In the last 5 years measures were taken for the active use of renewable sources of energy, new types of products were developed in the nickel, food and sugar industries, disease- and pest-resistant agricultural strains with a higher yield were developed, and the genetic characteristics of livestock and poultry were improved. The development of genetic engineering and biotechnology was stepped up in Cuba.

The congress advanced a theory of comprehensive scientific and technical development in close relation to national economic needs, stressed the need for the quickest possible incorporation of fundamental scientific discoveries and technological achievements in production and services and directed attention to the special importance of using modern methods of computer-aided management. Congress documents specifically said that primary significance within the framework of the strategy of Cuban development up to the year 2000 will be assigned to "measures aimed at the conservation and efficient use of

energy and material resources and the optimal use of production capacities, with a preference for the modernization of existing capacities rather than the construction of new facilities. The development of science and technology will serve the needs of the national economy and promote the more extensive use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, biotechnology, electronic and computer engineering and other advanced fields of science, which should serve as the foundation for the country's continued progress."

This 5-year period (1986-1990) should be decisive in the qualitative enhancement of the Cuban economy's effectiveness. The improvement of economic planning and management will play a tremendous role in the attainment of this goal. It was no coincidence that this matter has been given special attention at all three congresses of the PCC. At the third congress, F. Castro stressed that one of the most serious difficulties the country encountered in the last 5 years was the absence of a comprehensive approach to the planning of economic development and the substantiation of investments, which sometimes led to serious errors, such as the construction of new industrial enterprises and agricultural facilities in underdeveloped regions and others.

The Central Committee report mentioned the need for a creative approach when the economic planning and management experience of other socialist countries is adapted to the specific conditions of Cuba. The congress approved the national leadership's earlier decision to create a special national commission, under the jurisdiction of the Executive Committee of the Cuban Council of Ministers, of representatives of various government agencies and highly skilled and experienced specialists to perform the functions of a management, coordination and control center in the sphere of planning.

The most important congress decision pertaining to the medium-range development of the country was the approval of the Basic Guidelines for Cuba's Socioeconomic Development in 1986-1990. More than 13 million workers participated in the discussion of this document and made more than 13,000 suggestions, over 1,600 of which were included in the final draft. The document, which was drawn up in line with the draft PCC Program, stipulates the 18 main objectives of the new 5-year period. They include the growth of export revenues and the replacement of imports; the conservation and efficient use of energy and materials; the increased output of production capacities; the improvement of the quality of products and services; the efficient and complete use of all vehicles in the country; the reinforcement and expansion of the cooperative movement in rural areas; the consistent development of economic integration with the countries of the socialist community and the more effective use of the possibilities of industrialization through specialized and cooperative production; the enhancement of the effective contribution of science and technology to the resolution of socioeconomic problems in the country; the constant rise of the profitability of national production; the elevation of the public standard of living, etc.

The five-year plan envisages an average annual increase of at least 5 percent in national income. Import growth rates are to be maintained at a level below the growth rates of national income and exports. The level of accumulations is to be stabilized at around 20 percent. Labor productivity should

rise 3.5 percent a year. It should account for at least 60 percent of production growth. Expenditures per peso of commercial product should decrease by at least 1 percent a year. Special attention will be paid to the national food program as a strategic element of the national economy.

The document also contains specific plan assignments for various sectors of the national economy. In particular, the output of unrefined sugar should be at least 15 percent greater than the output of the previous 5 years. The output of oil should total 2 million tons in 1990, and refining capacities should almost reach 11 million tons that same year. The average annual increase in the output of the machine-building and metalworking industries should be 9.3 percent.

The decisions of the third congress will create an atmosphere of purposeful efforts to find new forms and methods of work in the country and will mobilize the creativity of the masses for successful socialist construction. "We," F. Castro said, "are well aware of the difficulties, obstacles and shortcomings that can and must be surmounted; we are stressing the need for competent, energetic and intense work. We will not tolerate indifference, carelessness, incompetence and irresponsibility. Our period of learning is over; the time has come for the maximum use of the colossal experience and knowledge accumulated during the years of revolution."

Defense of Social Conquests and Reinforcement of Political System

In the last 5 years, a congress speaker said, a labor code, supplemented with the suggestions of 2.3 million workers, was adopted for the first time in the country's history. Forms of labor organization were improved, partially as a result of supplementary payments, wage increases and merit raises. The general wage reform was completed and had a positive effect on the wages of more than 2.5 million workers. Besides this, the average monthly wage increased by 26.4 percent over the 5 years. Around 630,000 new jobs were created. Around a million people, not counting members of their families, are receiving social security benefits. Allocations for these purposes were 260 million pesos higher in 1985 than in 1980, totaling over a billion pesos. Whereas personal consumption increased by an average of 2.8 percent a year in 1981-1985, the figure was 7.1 percent for public fund consumption. These funds will increase by 3.9 percent a year in the new 5-year period.

The need for ration cards is declining, which is specifically attested to by the drop in the number of rationed goods from 150 in 1980 to 68 in 1985.

At the same time, the congress focused attention on the fact that the resolution of social problems should also serve the interests of the enhanced quality of social production.

It is already a documented fact that Cuba is ahead of all of the developing countries and some of the developed ones in its public health system. It was precisely on the strength of this, the Central Committee report said, that the after-effects of the serious dengue epidemic, in which the enemies of the Island of Liberty played a part, were quickly eliminated at the beginning of the last 5-year period.

The average life expectancy in Cuba is already over 74 years. Whereas there was 1 doctor for every 638 inhabitants in 1980, there was 1 for every 443 in 1985; the respective figures for stomatologists were 2,667 and 1,864. Infant mortality declined to 15 per 1,000 births in 1984. Such extremely complicated operations as heart transplants are now being performed in the country. The construction of medical establishments also developed quickly. The construction volume was 51 percent higher than in 1976-1980. New equipment was installed in 31 pediatric intensive care units, and the construction of 6 large hospitals and 43 polyclinics was completed.

The Cuban revolution's achievements in the educational sphere are equally impressive. More than 80 percent of all 5-year-olds, almost 100 percent of all children between the ages of 6 and 12 and over 87 percent of those from 13 to 16 are now enrolled in the educational system. The campaign to raise the educational level of adults (to the ninth grade) was completed successfully in the last 5 years: More than 670,000 workers completed the ninth grade of secondary school. The country now has 46 VUZ's, with a total of over 280,000 students. Whereas higher degrees were awarded to around 28,000 specialists between 1959 and 1970, the number exceeded 240,000 by the end of 1985. In 1981 there were around 205,000 people with a secondary technical education in the country. In 1985 their number more than doubled, almost reaching 430,000. In the Cuban system of secondary education, priority was assigned in 1981-1985 to the creation of a diversified network of specialized schools for 10th-, 11th- and 12th-graders.

In 1981-1985, 149 construction projects, including 50 schools, were completed to meet the needs of the educational system. "The broad scope of the educational system, the high educational level of the population and the constant improvement of academic facilities, combined with an increase in the number of teachers and instructors and an increase in the number of the greatest variety of higher academic institutions," the draft PCC Program stresses, "will allow the country to augment the potential of highly skilled specialists, unequalled in the 'Third World,' and to create exceptionally favorable conditions for the thorough development of the younger generation." The third congress of the Cuban communists directed the improvement of the educational system into the channel of the fuller use of accumulated potential for the attainment of major national economic objectives and the ultimate creation of an optimally operating economic structure.

There was a businesslike discussion of the entire group of questions connected with party social policy, and considerable attention was given to some of them, such as the housing problem, the organization of leisure and recreational activities for workers, the development of sports and physical culture and the improvement of work in the sphere of culture and the creative arts. As far as the housing problem is concerned, considerable efforts were made to solve it in the last 5 years. During this period the state built 126,000 apartments in urban and rural areas, and the available housing in the country, including dwellings built by cooperatives and private individuals, was augmented by 335,000 houses and apartments, which is triple the volume of residential construction in 1976-1980. The new five-year plan stipulates the construction of 185,000 apartments by the state, or 60,000 more than in 1981-1985, 15,000 houses and apartments by rural cooperatives and at least 180,000 houses and apartments by private individuals.

The supply of electrical appliances in apartments improved in the last 5 years. In 1985, for example, there were 50 refrigerators, 91 television sets, 152 radios and 59 washing machines for every 100 apartments with electricity (for the sake of comparison, the corresponding indicators for 1980 were 38, 74, 105 and 34).

The reinforcement of the republic's defensive capabilities was a matter of constant concern to the party. This was made necessary by the increased aggressiveness of the United States since the start of the Reagan Administration, which announced its doctrine of "national liberation war" against revolutionary Cuba. At the third congress Fidel Castro stressed that "the threats and some of the organizational measures of the Reagan Administration have only increased the defensive might of our country and have made our motherland an impregnable fortress." Plans of action in the event of U.S. aggression were drawn up and stipulated that the defense of the socialist fatherland is not only the function of the republic's Revolutionary Armed Forces, but also the sacred duty of all the people (the "concept of nationwide war"). "The thorough preparation of the country for defense on the basis of this concept," the draft PCC Program says, "will aid in establishing the necessary conditions for the repulsion of all types of imperialist aggression, including saturation air raids, naval blockades, warfare intended to wear down the adversary and even armed invasion." In line with this concept, all party and state organs and public organizations began performing a colossal amount of work in the early 1980's to deal with surprise attacks or the partial occupation of national territory. Measures were taken to improve the structure of regular units of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, with rapid deployment formations under their jurisdiction. The level of troop mechanization rose, troop fire power increased, and the ability of even small subunits to engage in active combat was secured.

Priority was assigned to the training of the civilian population in special units--territorial people's militia forces. Almost 1.5 million men and women were trained and equipped over the 5 years and are now ready for the armed defense of their socialist fatherland at any time. More than 70,000 officers were trained at the same time for the new and strong brigade of defenders of the revolution. Summing up the results of this colossal work, F. Castro announced that almost 80 percent of the fighting potential of the population--that is, men and women physically fit for combat, regardless of age--has been organized and that the resources needed for their active participation in defense have been secured.

The Party--The Leading Force of Cuban Society

The vanguard role in the political system of the Cuban society is played by the PCC, uniting over 520,000 communists and candidates for party membership. The party acquired almost 93,000 new members in the last 5 years. Furthermore, 43.2 percent of all communists work directly in production and services. Important steps were taken during the period between the second and third congresses to reorganize municipal party committees and involve them more directly in the work of primary organizations. To this end, standing commissions were set up for the analysis of various questions, and other forms of work were intensified to strengthen the party's relationship with the laboring

public. "In the intense struggle of these years," the Central Committee report said, "the party has undergone constant development as the great leading and uniting force in our society and as the truest expression of the authority, morality, conscience and vigilance of the revolution."

The congress approved several changes in the existing party charter to develop intraparty democracy, including changes to enhance the role and significance of primary party organizations and to institute biennial report and election campaigns, which will aid party committees in the better planning of their work in primary organizations. The Cuban people's mass organizations are reliable assistants in the realization of party strategy. They include the Young Communist League (with around 600,000 members and candidates), the trade unions which have around 3 million members and unite 99.5 percent of all workers, the National Association of Small Farmers, the Federation of Cuban Women with 3.1 million members (80 percent of all the women in the country), revolutionary defense committees (with over 6.5 million members, or 83.9 percent of the population over the age of 14), the Federation of University Students and the Federation of Students of Secondary Academic Institutions (around 460,000 members in all) and the Jose Marti Pioneer Organization (more than 1.72 million members, or 99.5 percent of all elementary and secondary schoolchildren). In reference to the level of maturity of the Cuban political system, F. Castro announced with complete justification at the congress that this is no longer "a handful of people in a small boat with more ideas than weapons, but a large and strong ship, fearing neither waves, nor wind, nor storms...."

Consolidation of International Positions

The Cuban revolution refuted the traditional bourgeois beliefs about the role and capabilities of small states in international relations. In spite of futile U.S. efforts, the republic had diplomatic relations with 121 states at the beginning of 1986 (the Batista regime, on the other hand, was recognized by only 51 states).

The main goal of Cuban policy in international affairs, the congress documents note, is the consolidation of socialism's positions on the global scale, the liberation and progress of people and the guarantee of peace. This policy is based "on Marxism-Leninism and the invincible practice of proletarian internationalism, on close cooperation with the Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist community, on strong ties with the world communist, workers and revolutionary movement and combat solidarity with national liberation movements and people fighting for their development, sovereignty and genuine independence."

Congress delegates and guests commended the unshakeable determination of the USSR and the entire socialist community to defend peace and frustrate official Washington's sinister foreign policy plans. The congress stressed the exceptional pertinence of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on the planet before the beginning of the new millennium, the prevention of the extension of the arms race to space and the reduction of conventional armament potential.

In a resolution on international politics, the congress declared its resolute support for people fighting against the global counterrevolutionary behavior of the Reagan Administration, expressed its international solidarity with Sandinist Nicaragua, the Salvadoran patriots, the Chilean resistance, the Haitians and Puerto Ricans, and the people and governments in all parts of the world that are opposing imperialist policy and defending their right to independent development.

Cuba's constructive policy in world affairs, in international organizations, particularly the United Nations, and in the nonaligned movement, in which Cuba performed the functions of its chairman in 1979-1983, was highly commended in speeches by foreign guests at the third congress. They expressed support for the Cuban Government's efforts to solve the foreign debt problem of the Third World, establish a new international economic order and stimulate integration processes in Latin America. Representatives from Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and other countries expressed their profound gratitude to the Cuban people for their internationalist assistance in various spheres. In particular, when President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua addressed the congress, he declared that "the nobility of these heroic people is particularly admirable. In spite of their limited resources and the continuation of their own struggle and deprivations, they are prepared to give up their most cherished possessions, lay down their lives and share their bread with fraternal peoples defending their independence and liberty in various parts of the world."

The third congress of the party of the Cuban communists was a major event in the life of the Cuban people and in the world liberation movement. The congress summed up the results of socialist construction, thoroughly analyzed the international situation and the foreign policy of the revolution, stipulated constructive ways of surmounting existing difficulties and fulfilling the five-year plan, and approved the draft party program, which will serve the Cuban communists and the entire population as a guiding star in the completion of the construction of a socialist society in the country. The draft program will be discussed thoroughly and in depth throughout 1986, and at the end of the year a special session of the third congress will approve the final draft of this extremely important document with a view to the suggestions and comments made during the nationwide discussion.

If the development of the Cuban revolution is viewed through the prism of the decisions of the third congress, it confirms the indisputable fact that the achievement of political power by the people is only the beginning of a long series of grand feats, which can only be accomplished and reinforced through the constant and intense constructive efforts of the revolutionary vanguard and the broad laboring masses.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

RADICAL LEFTIST MOVEMENTS, THEORIES CRITICIZED

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[Article by N. A. Vasetskiy: "Deadlocks of Pseudo-Revolutionary Movements"]

[Text] The bourgeoisie's shortage of positive ideas in recent years has led to a stronger tendency to spread anticommunist and anti-Soviet views through "leftist," pseudo-Marxist theses. This involves the use of radical leftist adventurism and opportunism, which are promoted in society by petty bourgeois reactionary political currents, especially Trotskyism and anarchism. Although the groundlessness of the ideological premises of ultra-leftist currents is now becoming increasingly obvious, this feature of the contemporary ideological struggle must never be ignored. Experience has shown that ultra-leftist protests can appeal to some segments of society in some situations. The radical left feeds parasitically on the successes of the laboring public's struggle and on its difficulties and failures. It is still not as strong as rightwing opportunism, but it is present in one form or another in many developing countries. Today there are more than 800 ultra-leftist currents, primarily anarchist and Trotskyist groups, in more than 90 non-socialist countries.¹

These figures certainly do not mean that the radical left is capable of becoming a major political force, but it does influence the alignment of forces in opposing class camps and can influence the outcome of this struggle. With rare exceptions, ultra-leftist groups are no more than "newspaper parties." When J. Posadas, one of the leaders of the Latin American Trotskyists, was overcome by a fit of frankness and had to admit "We have no masses,"² he was absolutely correct. The radical left poses another danger. It inhibits the development of the genuine revolutionary public consciousness and leads anti-imperialist protest movements into a blind alley with no visible exit. Experience has shown that people, especially young people, who have belonged to Trotskyist or other radical leftist groups are often a lost cause as far as revolutionary struggle is concerned. This is how strong the "corrosive" properties of ultra-leftist anticommunism are.

Another important aspect is the indirect effect of ultra-leftist ideology on some social strata. In the last 10 or 15 years, for example, Trotskyists and other ultra-leftists have won the support of 2-5 percent of the voters in a number of countries (Peru and Colombia), and this has represented hundreds of

thousands of people in each case. Of course, this does not mean that all of those who vote for ultra-leftist candidates become confirmed advocates of Trotskyism and support its program. No. This is merely a reflection of the influence of pseudo-revolutionary demagoguery on the laboring masses, and this influence must never be disregarded.

It is also important to remember that the general crisis of capitalism, which has taken particularly acute forms in the Latin American countries, is drawing more and more new social strata, including marginal strata, into the class struggle. The exposure of the radical left is one of the conditions for the successful elimination of obstacles on the road to the further expansion of the social base of revolutionary forces and the democratic and anti-imperialist movement. V. I. Lenin's statement that "struggle against imperialism is a false and meaningless concept unless it is indissolubly connected with struggle against opportunism."³

In our opinion, aspects of Marxist-Leninist teachings about the contemporary era, the theory and practice of the transition from capitalism to socialism and the forms and methods of revolutionary struggle in the international arena and in individual countries lie at the center of today's struggle of ideas. The author of this article intends to concentrate precisely on these matters.

What Are the Reasons for the New Hopes?

Of course, ultra-leftist ideologists could never be described as oppressors, but there is no question that they are serving the wrong cause, whether consciously or not, and that they are doing this with as much ingenuity as imperialism's frank apologists, if not more. Many of them, especially the Trotskyists, are now acting more discreetly, with a view to circumstances. Their counterarguments are being perfected and are becoming more varied and more subtle. Today's ultra-leftist groups are distinguished by a greater variety of means and methods of attracting attention than they had in the 1960's and 1970's. In addition to using their traditional forms of "direct action"--demonstrations, rallies, participation in strikes and the organization of public debates--the ultra-leftists have acquired new practices. They include the nomination of their own candidates in elections to various government bodies, speeches on radio and television, the presentation of lectures in academic institutions, including the most respectable ones, the inclusion of works by ultra-leftist ideologists in publications with a large readership, etc.

These and other actions were immediately commended by the bourgeois mass media, which began making references to the "maturity" of the ultra-leftists and to the difference between their present image and the earlier negative view of them: long-haired guys wearing faded denim, carrying bicycle chains, rubber hoses or clubs, shouting ultra-revolutionary slogans and displaying a willingness to break store windows, turn automobiles upside-down or burn them, and start brawls, and usually with members of antigovernment demonstrations or strikers. The bourgeois press began to portray the ultra-leftist leaders, especially the Trotskyists, as "serious" politicians with "new hopes."

What are the reasons for these new hopes? And why are the ultra-leftists being supported by those whom they have named as the targets of the most "resolute" struggle? The vitality of the radical left and its periodic outbursts of increased activity are closely related to the growth of petty bourgeois, non-proletarian revolutionary movements and are fostered by the sociopolitical and ideological features of the peripheral type of capitalism, distinguished by mass poverty and the sharp exacerbation of social and ethnic problems.

It is understandable that the laboring public's struggle grows more intense under these conditions. Its participants are not only members of the working class, but also those whom the bourgeois media called the "silent majority" 20 or 30 years ago, those who were regarded as one of the pillars of the political structure. They include members of the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, employees and other social groups that are growing rapidly under the conditions of the technological revolution. The reasons for the serious changes in their outlook and their motives for protest were expressed quite well, in our opinion, by famous Chilean writer Isabel Allende. When she was interviewed by Italy's L'UNITA newspaper, she said that any intellectual in Latin America, or even any person of integrity, has to take the side of leftist forces in politics because it is impossible to remain indifferent to the suffering of the people. "Who can remain indifferent on a continent tormented by militarism, poverty, social injustice, ignorance and illiteracy?" I. Allende exclaimed. She then went on to express a social attitude common to many Latin Americans: "My land is all of Latin America. This does not mean that we do not recognize the distinctive features of each country, but we have a common destiny, and until we are the masters of our own destiny we will be only a rubbish heap in the United States' back yard."⁴

The leaders of Trotskyist, anarchist and other ultra-leftist groups are taking advantage of these feelings of acute dissatisfaction. In this context, the resolution of the second conference of the Latin American sections of the committee for the reconstruction of the Fourth International states: "The worldwide revolutionary enthusiasm, which is reflected in Latin America in the existence of a general revolutionary situation--although it is developing in different ways in different countries--...has led to the formation of political and labor organizations of the working class, uncontrolled by the national bourgeoisie and the earlier communist or socialist parties.... The activities of Trotskyist organizations should be wholly aimed at assisting in the formation of these organizations."⁵ Similar aims have been stated by other groups of the Fourth International. "The chief aim of the Trotskyist movement in Latin America," the resolution of the Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International says, "is the creation of revolutionary parties with deep roots among the laboring masses."⁶

When the ultra-leftists address the petty bourgeois masses, they are aware that their appeals will impress these strata and will correspond to the outlook cultivated by their social milieu, academic institutions and bourgeois propaganda. The Trotskyist and anarchist slogans telling people that they can be revolutionaries and be hostile toward communists, Cuba, the USSR and other socialist countries are addressed primarily to these strata. In the

1980's the ultra-leftists, especially Trotskyists, have persistently tried to infiltrate the working class. Virtually all of their leaders are now advocating the transfer of most of their activity from universities to plants. For example, PRENSA OBRERA, a Trotskyist newspaper which began to be published in Peru in the 1980's, called itself a "free organ of the entire working class." The same idea is repeated in each issue of the newspaper: "Trotskyism believes in the revolutionary role of the working class."⁷

Who are the people the Trotskyists and other ultra-leftists are trying to reach behind the "plant gates"? Above all, they are the workers who were previously members of the petty bourgeoisie, peasants, craftsmen and other non-proletarian strata with highly unstable social behavior. The ultra-leftists are trying to use the political potential of working women, who account for a constantly rising percentage of the economically active population in the Latin American countries, and are making an intense effort to "win the trust" of the most oppressed strata of the bourgeois society: unskilled and semiskilled workers and the rural proletariat, as well as the unemployed, the lumpenproletariat, the lumpen-intelligentsia and other members of marginal strata.

It is no coincidence that the ultra-leftists have taken an interest in these segments of the laboring public. Their social behavior is distinctive because it is based on inconsolable despair and an awareness of the complete futility of hoping for any kind of change whatsoever in the near future. This hopelessness is what drives them to desperate means of struggle and a furious desire for total destruction. They entertain the hope that these methods can bring about radical changes--and, what is more, quick and immediate changes.

These people, according to the leaders of ultra-leftist groups, could make up a "broad activist stratum." After all, they are all distinguished by a desire for quick and radical changes. It is indicative that some ultra-leftist ideologists even try to portray these segments of the population as a "new revolutionary vanguard." A low standard of living has become the main criterion of revolutionary potential. "The unemployed in the capitalist countries and the laboring public in the Third World countries," the Trotskyists declare in this context, "represent the most exploited segment of the population."⁸

This approach reflects the common fundamental aims of all those who are bound together by hatred for scientific socialism and who wish to covertly--under the guise of struggle against imperialism--impede the gradual advancement of the world revolutionary process and, if possible, to push it back to earlier frontiers.

Unique "Ideological Dough"

The common political goals of the radical left and imperialism represent the tip of the iceberg that clearly reflects the stronger alliance of all reactionary forces and currents in the struggle against forces for social progress and national liberation. The use of the radical left by imperialism is a clear sign that local and world reactionary forces no longer rely only on

their own strength in the struggle against today's revolutionary forces. Its more farsighted policy and ideology reflect the realization that keeping the masses under its influence is becoming virtually impossible without an alliance with the petty bourgeois ideology and petty bourgeois pseudo-radicalism.

"This is one choir," V. I. Lenin wrote, "and one orchestra. It is true that the orchestra does not have a single conductor to lead it through the notes. International capital conducts by means less noticeable than a baton, but any quotation proves that this is only one orchestra."⁹

In the famous "Circular Letter to A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, W. Brakke et al," dated September 1878, K. Marx and F. Engels exposed the opportunism of several German social democratic leaders who dared to call themselves the teachers of the proletariat, writing: "These gentlemen have almost as many points of view as heads. Instead of clarifying a single matter, they have created incredible confusion, but, fortunately, almost exclusively among their own followers. The party could get along quite well without educators of this type, who are trying to teach others what they themselves have not learned."¹⁰ These lines naturally come to mind when we take a look at the ideological and political platforms of the ultra-leftists in Latin America. We constantly catch ourselves thinking that their leaders appear to be consciously competing with one another in the advancement of ideological postulates, the absolute majority of which last a day and then disappear just as soon as they have come into being.

The ideology of the radical left is a mixture of the most diverse, frequently conflicting ideological and political doctrines. Intermingling in a strange way and supplementing one another, they form a unique type of ideological "dough," from which hybrid theories are "baked."

There is no question that this reflects the efforts of competing ultra-leftist ideologists to attract attention and create additional opportunities for the recruitment of new followers. This phenomenon, however, also has quite definite social and ideological causes. The many faces of the radical left are primarily the result of the absence of a revolutionary future. This is one of the main reasons for its constant regression and its constant need to defend itself. "The period which began in the middle of the 1960's has ended," wrote Trotskyist ideologist P. Pettijean. "The extreme left has limited influence because of its adherence to sectarianism and its obsession with details, and also because it is confined to propaganda. Its liabilities obviously exceed its assets."¹¹

Adaptation to the metamorphoses of reality, to the succession of historical events and to reversals is a fundamental feature of the political image of the radical left. This is why its ideology is so unprincipled. Each new change in the balance of class power and in the development of the political situation leads to new forms of ideological and political vacillation by the ultra-leftist ideologists: from extreme adventurist and terrorist ones to the radical leftist reformist ones.

But something else is also obvious. No matter how many ultra-leftist species and subspecies exist, they have common generic features, and this is why

certain currents are defined as ultra-leftist ones. What are these features? What unites the ultra-leftist organizations and what separates them, simultaneously making them "fraternal twins" and "fraternal enemies"?

This question serves ultra-leftist theorists as a pretext for shameless ideological speculation. Many of them use this as an excuse to portray themselves as the "extreme left" of the revolutionary movement, which has supposedly seized the revolutionary strategic initiative. "We need a new revolutionary current," Trotskyist M. Verdier declared, "a movement around which all can unite..., which, in contrast to the current communist and socialist party leadership, would represent the genuine communist, genuine socialist position."¹²

This is a familiar refrain. It has been repeated by several different leftist currents. Back in 1908 V. I. Lenin was already speaking of attempts to intensify "revisionism from the left" in the international workers movement.¹³ At the beginning of the 1920's he launched a struggle against the infantile disorder of "left-wing communism" in the international communist movement. In addition to using the term "petty bourgeois reformism," he also made several references to "petty bourgeois revolutionism," and each time in a strictly negative context, to prove that a particular current was hostile to Bolshevism or the communist parties. Although petty bourgeois revolutionism tried to look like the opposite of petty bourgeois reformism, it had much in common with it. "The two deformities," V. I. Lenin remarked, "reinforced one another."¹⁴

Reinterpretation of Experience?

Lenin's statements about left-wing communism are still valid today. The features listed above, however, have acquired an even more noticeable appearance. The ultra-leftist activist reduces the class struggle primarily to his own misconception of violent, usually armed, forms of struggle. This is attested to by the experience of some Latin American guerrilla detachments in the 1960's and 1970's. The "military operations" of urban guerrillas in Brazil, the "Tupamaros" in Uruguay, the "Montoneros" in Argentina, the "M-19" group in Colombia and other less famous organizations reveal much more ostentatious pseudo-radicalism in their actions than real revolutionary behavior. And this was the case even though armed struggle in the form of partisan guerrilla warfare seems completely justified in Latin America, where bloody dictatorships are not rare and where the brutal treatment of individuals and contempt for elementary human rights are almost common practices for ruling circles. "Latin American partisan warfare," wrote Secretary General R. Arismendi of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay, "was the result of the sociopolitical situation on the South American continent and its resistance of American imperialism, although the errors in the theories and policies of some of its spokesmen were obvious."¹⁵

Even the ultra-leftist terrorists have to admit these errors. "The strategy of guerrilla warfare used by many revolutionary activists in Latin America in the second half of the 1960's," a resolution of the Colombian Trotskyists says, "was a failure."¹⁶ Of course, this does not mean that the ultra-leftists have given up terrorist actions. They are still resorting to them in some

countries. The widely publicized raid on the Palace of Justice in Bogota in November 1985 by the "M-19" group provides sufficient evidence of this. Nevertheless, even its members have acknowledged, although with some reservations, that the hope of achieving success through terrorist acts is a delusion. "We," announced one of the leaders of the group, Luis Otero, "are not fighting for the immediate seizure of power. Our goal is radical change."¹⁷

In any case, it is clear that there has never been, and can never be, a single grain of revolutionary conviction in the tactics of ultra-leftist terrorism. The senseless "bloodletting" of the extremists of the radical left is more likely to associate them with the extremists of fascist currents on the right. Extremists on both sides are distinguished by virtually the same forms of struggle. "Both display the same pseudo-culture. They have common origins," wrote Italian democrat and writer Pier Paolo Pasolini, who was later killed by terrorists, "common forms of behavior, common myths filling their heads and a common language--it is easy to confuse the two. Fascism and the radical left are based on the same principles (nota bene, I did not say the same ideological and political views), on the philosophical principles of irrationalism and pragmatism." We feel that these words tell us much, if not all, of what we need to know about ultra-leftist revolutionism. At the same time, communists certainly will not, as V. I. Lenin put it, "simply 'deny' this petty bourgeois movement or ignore it in a doctrinaire fashion,"¹⁸ especially since so many of the leftist currents formed recently in Latin America call themselves Marxist-Leninist and declare socialism to be their ultimate goal but simultaneously harbor prejudices against the international communist movement. In some cases these prejudices are connected with their self-affirmation. In others, they are engendered by sectarian errors. Experience has shown that anticommunist biases are usually surmounted and disappear as the members of these currents become involved in the anti-imperialist struggle.

The radical leftist organizations whose anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are part of their conscious and programmed hatred for everything connected with the very existence of real socialism and the struggle of the communist parties are quite a different matter. These are mainly Trotskyist and anarchist organizations. Maoist groups were also active among them until recently. After the Chinese leadership denounced the practice of "cultural revolution," however, they entered a phase of severe ideological confusion and organizational collapse. Their leaders hypothesize that capitalism has allegedly been "restored" in the USSR and in China. "The recognition of this key premise," the members of the "Proletarian Voice" declare, for example, "is the main thing in our struggle."¹⁹

With attacks of this kind, the ultra-leftists, urged on by bourgeois propaganda, are striving to neutralize the influence of communists in non-communist leftist currents. This is precisely why communists regard the radical leftist, pseudo-revolutionary movements as a strictly reactionary phenomenon, adding grist to the mill of the enemies of revolutionary and democratic forces. "The small groups performing this function," a statement of the Communist Party of Chile says, "were created to oppose the revolution in its name.... The enemy uses all of his propaganda media to encourage the actions of 'leftist anticommunists' and to popularize sectarian positions with their

assistance, striving to include them in popular movements, because the enemy realizes that there can be no genuine revolutionary activity when the vanguard is isolated from the masses. The enemy will pay any price for this isolation."²⁰

This statement was issued at the time of the Popular Unity government in Chile, but it is still relevant today (and to an even greater extent). Now that the Trotskyists, anarchists and Maoists have encountered the need to update their theoretical postulates, they are accomplishing this by intensifying, and not renouncing, the anticommunist, anti-Soviet, and now, as we see, anti-Chinese content of their theory and practice. In an attempt to find excuses for the bankruptcy of the ideological legacy of Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Trotsky, their contemporary followers allege that Marxism-Leninism is also suffering a crisis. "The present situation is unparalleled in history," Posadas wrote. "Neither Marx nor Engels, nor Lenin, nor Trotsky could have foreseen it. This is why the old brand of Trotskyism collapsed when it was faced by a process which did not fit into its plans."²¹

Radical leftist theorists needed this line of reasoning not so much to square accounts with their own past as to slander Marxism-Leninism and minimize its importance in the contemporary struggle of the laboring public. It is clear that these statements are evidence of ambitions verging on delusions of grandeur and of the assumption of non-existent "services" in the development of revolutionary theory.

Recent experience has proved that the only criterion by which the Trotskyist, anarchist and Maoist leaders are guided in their "renovating" activity is the degree to which a particular thesis is "useful" in their anticommunist strategy. Out of the entire array of facts and events, they choose only those that are, in their opinion, capable of securing the highest dividends. This method is nothing other than the interpretation of objective tendencies in social development in ways benefiting them. Some facts, especially those which do not agree with the premises of classic Trotskyism or anarchism, are groundlessly denied, while others are acknowledged because their denial would lead to the risk of self-exposure. "We," declared, for example, the anarchist Leval, should be more constructive than destructive. We should adopt a new lifestyle, emphasizing constructive efforts in all spheres of human endeavor, especially in the economic sphere."²²

When the ultra-leftists have to refer back to their predecessors, they "set them straight," so to speak, by acknowledging only those of their theories that can be used in the struggle against revolutionary forces. They discard everything that does not serve this central goal, calling it "irrelevant." In this way, even the meager revolutionary thrust of their theories is neutralized. Today neither Trotskyism nor anarchism, nor Maoism can be regarded as even remotely revolutionary. On the other hand, they cannot be relegated to the bourgeois apologist currents of social thought. In essence, they are typically reactionary petty bourgeois currents, striving to occupy some kind of intermediate position, midway between the exploited and the exploiters. This is the reason for the vacillation of the members of these movements, whose political behavior can easily accommodate both revolutionary "frenzy" and the betrayal of the revolutionary cause and the interests of the laboring masses.

Contemporary Appearance

The Trotskyist groups among today's many radical leftist organizations are those belonging to one of the seven groups of the Fourth International on the organizational level, and those loyal to the theory of "permanent revolution" and attempting to adapt it to present conditions on the ideological level. Anarchists, on the other hand, either do not recognize the need for organization or adhere to the principles of federalism. On the ideological level they profess various theories of anti-statism, denying all types of authority, including the proletarian government. The Maoist groups describe themselves as "Marxist-Leninist," emphasize the "national" nature of their activity and are still guided by the principles of "cultural revolution."

This system for the classification of contemporary radical leftist movements does not cover all of their distinctive features. As a rule, these definitions are conditional and often intermingled. Representatives of all radical leftist currents can be members of any one radical leftist group. This kind of problem-free coexistence testifies that the radical leftists are willing to tolerate a variety of ideological and tactical premises for the sake of preserving their organizations. This is the reason for the continuous circulation or transfer of members from one radical leftist group to another. Although the differences of opinion and disagreements between radical leftists can sometimes turn into acute conflicts, they are "intra-specific" differences. The uniqueness of their unity is attested to by the common features of Trotskyists and anarchists:

In the political sphere: flagrant anticommunism and the desire to "get a jump on" history by hurdling certain stages of social development.

In the sphere of theory: the misrepresentation of Marxism-Leninism, the opposition of real socialism with utopian theories, the manipulation of facts and the attempt to portray the particular or incidental events accompanying a given phenomenon as general and significant trends; the denial of dialectics and a reliance on sophistry, eclecticism, voluntarism and subjectivism.

In forms of struggle: the ostentatious renunciation of the "lowest forms" and appeals for an immediate transition to the "highest," radical forms of struggle, the underestimation of the possibility of using bourgeois democratic institutions in the anti-imperialist struggle, and the preaching of "direct actions" that often lead to terrorism or even vicious brutality.

In organizational matters: an obsession with spontaneity, and even in those cases when the need for a "revolutionary party" is acknowledged, the renunciation of organizations of the Marxist-Leninist type as an instrument to unite the vanguard with the masses and as a body to lead the revolutionary struggle, the replacement of this kind of organization with lower--from the standpoint of the ability to express the class interests and political will of the laboring public--organizational forms, such as labor unions, associations and so-called "parallel structures," etc.

The disclosure of the common features of radical leftist movements must be followed by a discussion of their distinctive features, stemming from the

time and place of the actions of each specific radical leftist group and specific variety of radical leftist adventurism and reformism. The radical left in Latin America takes a position "much further to the left" than in Western Europe, not to mention the United States. Posadas was already criticizing the Trotskyists in Western Europe in the beginning of the 1970's, particularly the French supporters of the "unified secretariat of the Fourth International," for their "rightist inclinations"--that is, for their renunciation of ultra-leftist tactics and methods. Of course, this does not mean that the continent has no ultra-leftist groups with social-reformist leanings. They include the supporters of anarchic syndicalism and the "new revolutionary organizations": the MIR--the Movement of the Revolutionary Left in Venezuela and Chile, the MOIR--the Independent Revolutionary Labor Movement in Colombia, and others. The Latin American Trotskyists who are part of the "unified secretariat of the Fourth International" take the position of "Euro-Trotskyism."

This position places less emphasis on the radical leftist aspects of Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" than on its inherent social-reformist principles. These Trotskyists arouse the anger of the ultra-leftists by accepting bourgeois democracy, participating in election campaigns, believing in the possibility of instituting reforms, etc. But even these radical leftists have to act in different ways than their colleagues in the developed capitalist countries. The tone of their reformism is more radical. They make constant references to the impossibility of carrying out reforms without destroying capitalism and to the senselessness of participation in elections. It is not surprising that the radical leftist reformists are just as fierce as the ultra-leftists in their attacks on worker organizations--communist parties and labor unions proposing concrete programs of struggle against monopolies and the oligarchy. It is precisely for this reformism disguised in the plumage of radical leftist words and concepts that some Soviet researchers categorize Trotskyism as the "ultra-leftist" wing of international petty bourgeois opportunism, which "is displaying increased activity on the ideological and political level and, consequently, is more dangerous precisely in Latin America, despite the limited nature of its influence."²³

The radical left is less anti-Cuban in Latin America, however, than in the developed capitalist countries. The radical leftists in Latin America recognize the Cuban revolution. This does not mean that they have drawn the right conclusions from it. The Cuban experience is used exclusively to prove the "relevance" of a political current supported by a particular radical leftist theorist.

The radical left in Latin America is also "less anti-Soviet." Fewer of its members--including Trotskyists and anarchists--in Latin America than in Western Europe and the United States flaunt their anti-Sovietism. In the 1980's, for example, the Posadists expressed support several times for some aspects of the Soviet leadership's domestic and foreign policies.

The radical left in Latin America is "less anticommunist." It disguises its hostility toward communist parties more carefully. The radical leftists in Latin America are not reluctant to profit from the constantly rising prestige of the communist parties among the laboring masses. This is the reason for

their attempts to disguise themselves as "genuine" communists opposing the allegedly "bureaucratic" leadership.

Of course, these features of the radical left in Latin America do not cover all of the complexity of this phenomenon. They do provide an understanding, however, of how the radical left has adapted to the conditions of a continent where the laboring public is much more active socially than in the imperialist centers, where Cuba is a synonym for unparalleled heroism and where the Soviet Union is regarded as the most reliable and loyal friend in the Latin American people's difficult struggle for economic independence, peace, democracy and progress. It was no coincidence that Trotskyist ideologist D. Benside once remarked: "It is true that Latin America sees the USSR as a loyal defender and guarantor in its struggle against imperialism."²⁴

All of this does not mean, however, that the radical left in Latin America has "turned over a new leaf," although it is also possible that one group or another could take a truly revolutionary position during the course of the previously discussed changes. The metamorphoses the radical left has undergone in Latin America have usually not reached the "boiling point" at which a "new substance" begins to take shape. Evolutionary processes are extremely uneven and are usually dictated by the need for adaptation. These facts must be borne in mind in any critical analysis of the radical left's speculations on the development of the revolutionary process and in estimates of the further evolution of radical leftist theories.

George Bernard Shaw once said: "The morals of a nation are like teeth: The more they decay, the more they hurt." The same can be said of the radical left and its ideological theories and premises. They become more "decayed" as they skip ahead of life and revolutionary practice. And all attempts to touch them become more dangerous because the risk of their complete disintegration increases considerably. Revolutionary theory cannot be invented. It grows out of all revolutionary experience.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Krizis strategii sovremennogo antikommunizma" [The Crisis of Contemporary Anticommunist Strategy], Moscow, 1984, p 279.
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3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 424.
4. ZA RUBEZHOM, 1986, No 4, p 22.
5. "Tribune Internationale," LA VERITE, 1985, Paris, No 30, p 4.
6. "Sobre America Latina. Proyecto de resolucion de la mayoria de Secretariado unificado de la IV Internacional. Publicado por atencion del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores de Colombia," 1979, p 117.

7. PRENSA OBRERA, Lima, 1980, No 33, p 5.
8. ROUGE, Paris, 10-16 June 1985, p 16.
9. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 43, p 139.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 19, p 174.
11. ROUGE, 3-9 October 1985, p 7.
12. LUTTE OUVRIERE, Brussels, 11 January 1986, p 4.
13. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 17, p 25.
14. Ibid., vol 41, p 15.
15. R. Arismendi, "Lenin, Revolution and Latin America," Moscow, 1975, p 561.
16. "Sobre America Latina...", p 71.
17. LE MONDE, Paris, 8 November 1985.
18. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 10, p 58.
19. ROUGE, 18-25 July 1985, p 12.
20. "Borba kommunistov protiv ideologii trotskizma" [The Communist Struggle Against the Trotskyist Ideology], Moscow, 1973, p 28.
21. BULLETIN DU SECRETARIAT INTERNATIONAL DE LA IV INTERNATIONAL POSADISTE, 1980, No 8, p 9.
22. G. Leval, "Marxisme et anarchisme," in "Anarchici e Anarchia nel mondo contemporaneo," Torino, 1971, pp 596-597.
23. K. A. Khachaturov, "Latinskaya Amerika: ideologiya i vneshnyaya politika" [Latin America: Ideology and Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1983, p 66.
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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

STROESSNER REGIME'S 'STRANGLEHOLD' ON PARAGUAY EXAMINED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 86 (signed to press 17 Sep 86)
pp 32-45

[Article by M. A. Oborotova: "The Crisis of the Stroessner Dictatorship"]

[Text] The military dictatorships in South America entered a period of severe crisis in the beginning of the 1980's. The economic, social and political models of development that had taken years to establish began to split at the seams. The masses took action. Sensing the tenuousness of their position, the military returned to their barracks, in line with a timely decision in some cases (Brazil) or as an emergency measure in others (Argentina). By spring 1985 civilian governments had taken the place of military juntas in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia. Only in two South American countries, Chile and Paraguay, had the dictatorial regimes refused to relax their death grip on the helm of government.

When J. Duvalier and F. Marcos fled their countries in February 1986 with the active assistance of the United States, it was clear that the Reagan Administration's policy toward Third World dictators had changed. And Paraguay was once again the focus of attention along with Chile and South Korea.

Reports of mass protest demonstrations in the streets of Asuncion came out of Paraguay in April 1986. Members of the Paraguayan opposition began speaking hopefully of the coming of the long-awaited "democratic spring." They wondered how and when one of the most odious regimes in South America would come to an end.

The dictatorship in Paraguay was established in 1954, after a successful coup d'etat by General Stroessner. More than three decades have gone by since that time, and Stroessner, the continuous president of the country, commander in chief of the armed forces, honorary chairman of the ruling Colorado Party and patron of the Catholic Church, has earned another title--the oldest dictator on the continent, or the "last tyrannosaurus in Latin America."¹ In this case, the adjective does not refer to the advanced age of the general, who just turned 73, but to the length of his presidency. In terms of this parameter, Stroessner has no equals in the 20th-century history of Latin America and he has surpassed Batista, Jimenez, Trujillo, Somoza and many other dictators of the continent.

The general has been awarded various titles by his stooges--"Supreme Leader," "Restorer," "Defender of the Peace" and "Best Fighter of the American Continent." One of the flatterers even asserted that fate had foreordained Stroessner's mission from the cradle, because his father "felt excited and happy when he heard the infant's first cries--it seemed to him that they heralded a new dawn."² For a long time, however, the life of the future dictator was not marked by any events transcending the bounds of dull day-to-day existence. He was born on 3 November 1912 in Encarnacion, a small town on the border near Argentina, into the completely unremarkable family of a Paraguayan woman and a Bavarian brewer who had emigrated to Paraguay at the beginning of the century. The biographical data of his childhood and adolescence are meager and unimpressive: He was a mediocre soccer player on his home town team and an average student and cadet at the military academy. Stroessner's military career represented only a series of banal events for a long time. He was in the war with Bolivia (1932-1935) and returned from it with the rank of lieutenant and without a single heroic act to his credit. He spent 3 years in Brazil on a military assignment. The long years he spent in Paraguay, mainly in the northern Chaco, after his return were marked only by a succession of scheduled promotions in rank. Even then, however, Stroessner's military superiors noticed some of his personality features that later left their imprint on the dictator's military and political career: He performed his duties in a precise, industrious and indefatigable manner, he was a good organizer and "a careful officer, able to command, disciplined, persistent, ingenious and decisive."³

In the middle of the 1940's Lt Col Stroessner became active in national politics, siding with the reactionary army group supporting General Higinio Morinigo and with the Colorado Party. The hegemony these forces established as a result of the civil war of 1947 paved the way for the grand ambitions of the officer from the hinterlands. He plunged into the struggle for power and was a party to all of the putschist conspiracies during the period of anarchy following the civil war.

In May 1954 Stroessner led the coup d'etat that carried him to the heights of power. A few months later the Colorado Party nominated him its presidential candidate and secured his victory in an uncontested "election." In his position as head of state, some of Stroessner's qualities, such as his shrewdness and prudence, decisiveness and caution, brutality and ingenuity, were revealed in their entirety. Within a fairly short period of time he had established a dictatorial regime unique in many respects, making use of much of the rich experience of other Latin American dictators but simultaneously accomplishing certain innovations that were not within the power of Somoza, Trujillo or other "patriarchs" of the continent.

The dictator made the armed forces and the Colorado Party the main pillars of his supreme authority. He bought the loyalty of officers by including them in the so-called illegal economy--or, more precisely, unlawful activities: the trade in contraband narcotics,⁴ alcohol, motor vehicles and other luxuries, which produced a higher income than all of the country's foreign trade.⁵ With Stroessner's help, the military clique amassed colossal wealth. The most wealthy of its members (after Stroessner, it goes without saying) is the

second highest ranking officer in the army, General Andres Rodriguez, the commander of the First Army Corps. He personally controls major smuggling operations on the border between Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil. Besides this, he owns a currency exchange agency, the San Antonio Refrigeration Combine and three estates in the Chaco and is one of the main stockholders in the Asuncion Beer Company, with 6 million dollars in assets. General Abraham Abete, the director of the Military Geographic Institute, is a receiver of drugs delivered to him in small planes from the estates of high-level officials of the regime, and he distributes the drugs through the diplomatic mail. He is a major real estate owner in the capital and its suburbs. Sabino Augusto Montanaro, the minister of the interior, owns many cattle ranches and specializes in the trade in contraband electronics and electrical appliances. This list could be continued for a long time by including the names of General Gerardo Johansen, General Marcial Samaniero, General Juan Caceres and others.⁶

Incidentally, the loyalty of the armed forces to the dictator has not been secured only by this economic leverage. As the commander in chief of the armed forces, Stroessner personally approves all appointments and transfers in the army--from junior lieutenant to chief of staff. He keeps a close watch on the mood of the officers, sentencing unreliaables either to forced labor in draining the Chaco or to "honorable exile" as military attaches. Besides this, the dictator has a "guard battalion" at his disposal, consisting of people handpicked by the secret police. This subunit of 1,500 men has approximately the same fire power as the rest of the army. It is not accountable to the armed forces command and is subordinate only to the president. Stroessner also controls a "police security battalion" (400 men), created in the image and likeness of the "guard battalion," and his secret police (100 men). These formations with a total of 2,000 men make up the president's Pretorian Guard and can be used to quell unrest in the army. In view of all this, we must agree with American researcher P. Lewis, who wrote that, for the Paraguayan military, "it is not so easy to organize a rebellion."⁷

General Stroessner has not confined himself, however, to giving officers economic privileges and establishing strict control over the army, but has gone much further than other Latin American dictators in the "politicization" of the armed forces. He ordered all soldiers to join the ruling Colorado Party and simultaneously "militarized" the latter by giving it a rigid hierarchical structure.

Corruption, which has acquired incredible dimensions in the country, is prominent among the many links connecting the army with the ruling party in Paraguay. Virtually all officials, starting with the president himself, take bribes. According to people close to the dictator, he received 5 million dollars from international drug dealer (O. Rikor) in exchange for permission to operate freely in Paraguay and organize the export of illegal drugs to other countries. In turn, Stroessner gave 2 million dollars to members of the government to enlist their support. However large this sum might seem at first, it is a mere pittance in comparison to the 150 million dollars the dictator was paid by transnational corporations for signing the agreement with Brazil on the construction of the Itaipu GES.⁸

The general's subordinates are following in his footsteps. One diplomat told of a cabinet minister who demanded 2 million from a 12-million contract. And this is far from the only example. Money can buy anything in Paraguay. A precise fee has been set for everything: 200 dollars for a permanent residence permit, 200 dollars for citizenship, up to 700 dollars for a passport....⁹ "Paraguay is a real bordello. The scales, intensity and shamelessness of the corruption here are unique. Each banknote here gives off a stench," one businessman angrily declared.¹⁰ The corruption of civil servants and the military is another of the factors cementing the dictatorial regime in Paraguay.

In this way, a unique fusion of the army and the ruling party, which has probably never been experienced by any other dictatorship on the continent, has been created through Stroessner's efforts. This has become one of the main guarantees of the political stability of the Stroessner regime.

Supported by the army and the Colorado Party, the dictator established strict control over national politics. The armed forces and the police, trained by Nazi criminals who found political asylum in Paraguay, are the guards of "law and order" and, when necessary, can serve as an instrument of terror and repression. Exceptionally "favorable" conditions have been established in Paraguay for their activity. A permanent state of siege has been in effect in the country for virtually the entire time Stroessner has been in office. It is renewed every 3 months and is rescinded once every 5 years on "election" day. This system is unequalled in the world. The regime periodically conducts "combing" operations--raids on homes and entire neighborhoods and regions and mass arrests of so-called "subversive elements" allegedly connected with "international communism." Any person can be arrested in accordance with Article 79 of the constitution, which instituted the state of siege.¹¹

Since 1954, 360,000 Paraguayans have filed through the regime's prisons.¹² And this has happened in a country with a population of just over 3 million. It is impossible to determine how many people have died under torture or during kidnappings and punitive raids. More than 1.5 million Paraguayans have had to emigrate.¹³ Many did this for political reasons. For many years the country has been enveloped in an atmosphere of terror, paralyzing the will and strength for political and social protest. "Heap up the horrors and you will end up with a sweeping and repulsive panorama. But what is really interesting...is how a country can still be governed by means of a faultlessly cultivated sense of fear after three decades. This fear is now maintained by isolated but carefully calculated actions. A man disappears.... A woman is tortured.... This is enough, and Stroessner's people know this," one Paraguayan who preferred to remain anonymous bitterly remarked.¹⁴

The Colorado Party plays a prominent role in the system of police control of the country along with repressive forces. A branch of the party functions in each town--a low-level party cell representing part of the structure of the civil guard, which keeps the population under surveillance throughout the country. A broad range of operations are controlled by branches of the party--from job placement to the distribution of all goods. Membership in the ruling party is an essential condition for those seeking a place in the system of

social security or public health, in a university or in the civil service, those wanting to sign a contract or even those who simply want an identity card.

The members of the Colorado Party represent the dictator's permanent constituency (a million loyal and absolutely reliable votes).¹⁵ Elections are held every 5 years in Paraguay. Their falsification has been perfected to the maximum.¹⁶ The votes are counted by government functionaries. The Colorado candidate--invariably A. Stroessner--receives 87-90 percent of the votes in each election farce.¹⁷

Only two other parties--the Liberal and Liberal Radical parties--are represented in the puppet parliament along with the ruling Colorado Party. The "legal opposition"--Stroessner legalized these two parties at the beginning of the 1960's with the aim of creating a "democratic" facade for his dictatorship--piously observes the rules of the political game and obediently nominates its own candidates for presidential elections. For participating in the election farces, the opposition candidates are usually appointed ambassadors to "prestigious" countries, and the parties themselves automatically receive a third of the seats in parliament.

Four other bourgeois opposition parties tolerated by the regime--the Febrerista Revolutionary (affiliated with the Socintern), the Christian Democratic and the Authentic Radical Liberal parties and the Popular Colorado Movement (which broke away from the official Colorado Party in 1959)--created the National Accord (AN) coalition in 1978 to "promote the establishment of a democratic order" by peaceful means.¹⁸ The AN platform included demands for the cancellation of the state of siege, a sweeping political amnesty, the dissolution of the repressive network, respect for human rights and the establishment of a truly republican system of government.¹⁹ The unification of the four opposition parties on the basis of democratic and anti-dictatorial demands was an important event in Paraguayan politics. The coalition was too insulated, however, and, according to the apt definition of AFRIQUE-ASIE magazine, resembled "an elite bourgeois association striving to be viewed by Washington as an alternative."²⁰ From the very beginning its members excluded the possibility of participation by leftist forces and showed no interest in opening their ranks to the masses. For this reason, the moderate bourgeois opposition, which had been allowed to function within the boundaries set by the dictatorship, could not pose a threat to the regime.

The radical opposition, represented by the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP), has had to operate far underground and in exile. After declaring its anti-communist creed, the regime subjected communists to repression, persecution, torture and death. The PCP ranks were infiltrated by provocateurs, who inflicted colossal damage on the communists and on the entire Paraguayan revolutionary movement. Many party members have been arrested or are missing. They include First Secretary of the PCP Central Committee A. Maidana, Secretary of the Central Committee M. A. Soler, Central Committee members E. Roa and R. Gonzalez, Secretary of the Federation of Communist Youth D. Villagra and many others. In spite of brutal attacks and heavy losses, the PCP has continued its struggle and has resolved to overthrow the Stroessner

dictatorship and to unite all anti-dictatorial forces without exception in a national front. According to the Paraguayan communists, however, the "main weakness of the revolutionary popular movement in Paraguay is still its inadequate unity and organization."²¹

At the end of the 1960's, especially after the Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellin (in 1968), the Catholic Church, which had always supported the Stroessner dictatorship almost without question, became active in national politics. The church openly condemned the terror and declared the need for social change, especially agrarian reform. The Catholic University, founded in 1960, became the center of the reformist movement. After a number of protest rallies and student demonstrations, the Stroessner government, upset by the disturbances of the customary "peace" in the country, retaliated. The police stormed the campus of the Catholic University twice, beating students and arresting professors, many of whom were subsequently deported. Outraged by these actions, Archbishop I. Rolon excommunicated the chief of police and the minister of the interior. The regime, however, only intensified the repression. Weakened by a new wave of persecution and deportations, the church retreated and submerged its reformist feelings. Its opposition activity was neutralized even more by the wave of arrests and exiles following the discovery of the conspiracy against the president in 1974.

For a long time there was no serious internal threat to the regime. There were no external threats either. The United States supported Stroessner's coup in the hope of strengthening its position in Paraguay, where Great Britain had traditionally had strong influence. In 1954 the United States signed an agreement on military and economic cooperation with Paraguay and received permission to build military bases in the country. In 1965 the American House of Representatives passed the Selden resolution, granting the United States (with Paraguay's consent) the right of unilateral intervention in this South American country in the event of a direct or indirect threat from "international communism."²² In spite of periods of political tension in relations with Paraguay in connection with the illegal heroin trade (1971) and the violation of human rights (1978), Washington has invariably given the Stroessner regime financial support. Official U.S. aid to Paraguay totaled 146 million dollars by 1970. Much of the American assistance, however, was sent through international financial organizations under U.S. control. The dictatorship received 311 million dollars from the Inter-American Bank for Development and 175 million from the IBRD just between 1961 and 1979.²³

Stroessner reciprocated with warm feelings. He called Paraguay the "best friend of the United States," completely supported Washington's policies in the United Nations and the OAS and offered American monopolies an entire series of lucrative concessions. For example, American companies (Texaco Paraguay, Marathon Petroleum Paraguay and Trend Resources International) control all of the oilfields in Paraguay, and the American Anschutz Corporation acquired the exploitation and mining rights to uranium and other minerals throughout the country's eastern region, occupying 40 percent of its territory.

The Stroessner regime has maintained excellent relations with military governments in neighboring states--Brazil, Argentina (Paraguay's two leading foreign

policy and foreign economic partners) and Bolivia. The ideological similarities of the military dictatorships, their cooperation in intelligence and defense, and the interest of Brazil and Argentina in economic expansion in Paraguay and in the exploitation of its rich hydroelectric resources laid a solid foundation for these relations.

Foreign capital, which dominates key sectors of the Paraguayan economy, is an important pillar of the Stroessner regime. At the beginning of the 1980's foreign capital controlled 80 percent of the industrial enterprises, 90 percent of the banking capital, 80 percent of the foreign trade companies and virtually all natural resources in the country. Foreign monopolies were attracted by the extremely favorable conditions in Paraguay for the investment of capital and the extraction of maximum profits--the relative political stability of the regime, the cheap raw materials and manpower, exemptions from various duties and taxes, and favorable legislation (the law allows them to export 100 percent of their profits from the country and to withdraw invested capital after 8 years). Foreign monopolies have a strong interest in keeping the privileged position the Stroessner regime has guaranteed them.

Therefore, a variety of factors secured the political stability of the Paraguayan dictatorship. Nevertheless, all of the abovementioned would hardly have been enough to grant the regime such a long period of well-being if Paraguay had not been blessed with "manna from heaven" at the beginning of the 1970's. In 1973 Paraguay and Brazil signed an agreement on the construction of the world's largest GES, the Itaipu complex, on the border river Parana. Brazil assumed the lion's share of project financing--90 percent of the 23 billion dollars²⁴--and Paraguay promised to pay its share with electrical power.

The Itaipu project led to an economic boom in the country. The construction in the region of the GES and in Asuncion and the soaring land prices throughout the country resulted in the creation of new fortunes, virtually full employment and a colossal influx of foreign capital. Whereas the Paraguayan GDP growth rate in the 1960's was 4.2 percent a year, in the 1970's it suddenly rose to 8.3 percent and then exceeded 10 percent in 1976-1981.²⁵ High economic growth rates combined with huge profits and a high level of employment throughout the 1970's kept the Stroessner regime afloat. It seemed as though the "autumn of the patriarch" in Paraguay would last forever....

The happy days of the Stroessner regime, however, were numbered. The economic boom caused by the Itaipu project ended at the beginning of the 1980's, and Paraguay slowly but surely entered a period of economic crisis. There was a decrease of 2 percent in the GDP in 1982 and of 3.7 percent in 1983.²⁶ In 1982 Paraguay had a negative balance of payments of 10 million dollars, as compared to the positive balance of 45 million in 1981. The country's foreign debt reached 1.2 billion dollars. The influx of foreign capital decreased dramatically. Agriculture, the extractive industry and construction suffered a decline. Unemployment rose to 45 percent of the able-bodied population.

Just as in other South American countries with dictatorial regimes, the deterioration of economic conditions had sociopolitical consequences. The sudden

reduction of export operations as a result of the crisis severely injured the owners of enterprises and large livestock breeding farms and small landowners producing items for export. There was mounting dissatisfaction in urban and rural areas. The rapid development of the economy in the 1970's gave birth to a new stratum of businessmen unconnected (at least directly) with the Stroessner clan. These groups, which were joined by several representatives of foreign capital, objected to the incompetence and widespread corruption of official agencies. The social base of the dictatorship gradually contracted.

The dictator's first response to the mounting social dissatisfaction was a group of manipulative actions. At the end of 1983 he allowed some political emigrants to return to the country, thereby engendering the hope that the regime had embarked on the road of liberalization.

The opposition movement in Paraguay began to grow in 1984. Encouraged by the fall of the dictatorships in Argentina and Bolivia, the instability of the regime in Chile and the changes in Brazil and Uruguay, the Paraguayans opposed the tyranny they despised. Mass rallies organized by the opposition were held in Asuncion under the slogan "The military dictatorship will come to an end!" for the first time in many years at the beginning of 1984. Demonstrators demanded immediate measures to improve the state of the economy, the resignation of the reactionary clique, the restoration of democratic rights and freedoms, the cessation of repression and the release of political prisoners.²⁷ A political demonstration by 10,000 people, extraordinary for Stroessner's time, was held in the center of the capital in February of the same year. The demonstrators demanded the cancellation of the state of siege and the democratization of the country.²⁸

Stroessner, however, had no plans for even the limited liberalization of the regime. In March 1984 he had already closed the offices of ABC COLOR, the newspaper which had been criticizing the regime for 17 years, and he intensified the police surveillance and persecution of opposition leaders soon afterward.²⁹ These measures temporarily cooled the opposition passions but could not stop the political crisis of the regime.

In 1985 rumors about the deteriorating health of the dictator were followed by a battle in the ruling Colorado Party over Stroessner's successor. The party split into two wings--the "traditionalists," headed by Minister of the Interior Sabino Montanaro, and the "activists," led by Mario Abdo Benitez, the president's private secretary. The "traditionalists," the offspring of the Colorado's founders, have considerable influence in party executive agencies and in the government and advocated the nomination of a civilian as the presidential candidate in 1988, when Stroessner's term in office will end, regarding this as the best way of securing a smooth transition and preserving the Colorado's dominant position in national politics. They proposed two possible successors--Luis Maria Arganha, chairman of the supreme court and once a member of the International Court of Justice in The Hague (according to some reports, this nomination was supported by the United States), and Sabino Montanaro.³⁰ The "activists," who joined the party after Stroessner took power and who owe their status and wealth to him, proposed that the dictator be succeeded by his son, Lt Col Gustavo Stroessner.³¹ This current controls the majority of

low-level party cells. Gustavo Stroessner was unable, however, to win the support of the armed forces, the supreme command of which regarded him as a totally incompetent officer and, what is more, nurtured a strong hatred for the "gray cardinal"--Mario Benitez. The debates in the ruling party posed no direct threat to A. Stroessner. They concerned what would happen after 1988. Furthermore, both groups were being torn apart by internal discord. Nevertheless, they represented another symptom of the political unrest in the country.

To prevent the intensification of the political crisis in Paraguay, the United States, according to the admission of American officials, began to exert "mild pressure" on the Stroessner government to encourage limited liberalization.³² President Reagan included Paraguay among the Latin American dictatorships twice (in December 1984 and in May 1985) and made it clear that the United States wanted "democratic changes" in this country.³³ At the end of 1985 the new U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, K. Taylor, openly established contact with the opposition through the AN to investigate the possibility of a "peaceful transition."

The extremely restrained U.S. measures nevertheless aroused a storm of indignation on the highest levels of the Paraguayan Government. The pro-government press attacked the American ambassador, who was chosen as the scapegoat, and accused him of all sorts of sins, from the allegation that he was "encouraging the kind of destabilization that has just recently occurred in other parts of the world"³⁴ to the assertion that it was difficult to see any difference between him and Qadhafi.³⁵ The oversensitive reaction to the U.S. ambassador's contacts with the Paraguayan opposition reflected the mounting worries of government circles in connection with the changes in Washington's policy in the Third World. These worries grew even stronger after the events in Haiti and the Philippines.

The U.S. actions had the opposite effect on the bourgeois opposition in Paraguay. They inspired it. A new wave of opposition activity swept through the country in the beginning of 1986. With the support of the Catholic Church, the AN proposed a nationwide dialogue to lay the foundation for a peaceful transition to democracy in Paraguay. The plan proposed by Domingo Laino, the leader of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party in exile, envisaged a transition supervised by a military junta with the aid of a council made up of representatives of all political parties, and with the Catholic Church acting as intermediary.³⁶ On 23 January 1986 the church appointed three prelates, headed by Bishop G. Livierez, to act as mediators, and set forth the opposition's proposals in a letter to the leaders of the Colorado Party.³⁷

The government was quick to respond. On 25 January the police broke up a rally organized by the Popular Colorado Movement (MOPOCO). The carefully planned operation, which left many wounded, was intended to make an impression on the opposition. The advocates of a hard line closest to Stroessner in the government categorically refused to take part in any kind of dialogue with the opposition.³⁸ The police raid was also a warning to the more discerning Colorado Party members who favored reunification with MOPOCO and the institution of moderate reforms. This action, however, did not intimidate the

opposition, which believed that the United States was on its side and that it ultimately could not fail.

The confidence of the moderate opposition leaders nurtured the vigorous efforts of the U.S. embassy in Paraguay to implement the so-called "third force strategy." According to this "strategy," the United States was supposed to first weaken the support of "friendly" dictatorships and then concentrate on strengthening a third "democratic" force with the aim of depriving communists of the chance to lead the opposition movement. In spring 1986 the U.S. ambassador in Paraguay met several times with AN leaders and with the Colorado Party members favoring the renovation of the regime, assuring each group that the United States wanted "democratization." Besides this, Taylor showed the opposition leaders the text of a speech by U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, formulating the following essential conditions for the "transition to democratization": the ruling party's loss of legitimacy as a result of the aggravation of economic problems, war, corruption or the death of the leader; the desire of the population and certain classes for democracy; the support of the United States and other countries, which could be decisive; pacification and amnesty with the aim of social peace; decisive action by such autonomous forces as the army and church. "We cannot create democratic movements where they do not already exist; we can make them strong if they are weak"--this was the main conclusion of the report.³⁹

The external pressure on the Stroessner regime, therefore, was growing stronger. Internal pressure grew stronger at the same time. Mass demonstrations (with up to 5,000 demonstrators) and protest rallies organized by various opposition forces were held in a number of Paraguayan cities from March to May 1986. The demonstrators made economic demands and advanced political slogans--"Let us put an end to the dictatorship in Paraguay!"; "Democracy--yes, dictatorship--no!"; "Duvalier fell today, Stroessner and Pinochet will fall tomorrow!" The Paraguayan Communist Party called for a broad anti-dictatorial front to "create the necessary conditions for the overthrow of the dictatorship with the use of all necessary means and to form a provisional government of patriotic and democratic unity."⁴⁰

Faced by the growing mass movement, the dictatorship unhesitatingly chose the tried and tested method of securing "law and order," striving to stop the evolution of the opposition into a strong political alternative to the regime before it was too late. The police came after the demonstrators with fire-arms, electric clubs, fire hoses and tear gas grenades. People were killed and wounded. Many opposition activists were arrested. "We will not yield a single millimeter to the enemies of progress, peace and the happiness of our people"--Mario Abdo Benítez used these words to express the official position.⁴¹ He was seconded by General Gaspar Martínez, Paraguayan minister of national defense, who warned that the armed forces would defend government institutions "with inexorable determination."⁴² The statements by these pillars of the regime were then amplified by Stroessner himself, who had remained silent about the events in the country for a long time. He called the critics from the ruling party "deserters" and threatened to revive, if necessary, the militarized Colorado detachments that had guarded the regime until the 1960's.⁴³ In May 1986, when he was in Brazil, he also declared his intention to run

again for the presidency if the ruling Colorado Party should make this decision and if the state of his health would permit him to run. Besides this, he denied any possibility of his retirement.

In this way, the regime displayed its determination to use the old repressive methods of stifling the protest movement, and Stroessner expressed no intention of leaving office. Nevertheless, much has changed in Paraguay in the last few years. The economic crisis has shaken the political foundation of the dictatorship. There are disagreements in ruling circles over the future regime. The opposition has taken action. The masses have surmounted their fears and have taken to the streets to join protest demonstrations. The United States, striving to prevent the radicalization of the situation in the country, is supporting moderate forces advocating the reform of the political system. In neighboring states, where rightwing authoritarian regimes were in power for a long time, democratic processes are taking place. Under these conditions, a return to the past--to the "golden days" of Stroessnerism--is impossible. As for the future of the country, it will depend to a considerable extent--as in Haiti and the Philippines yesterday and in Chile today--on possible changes in the position of the armed forces--the only institution which has remained completely loyal to the dictatorship to date.

FOOTNOTES

1. NEWSWEEK, New York, 1984, vol CIV, No 8, p 38.
2. LE MONDE, Paris, 29-30 April 1984.
3. Ibid.
4. Paraguay is now one of the main producers of heroin in the world and is a base of the international Mafia, which is active in the heroin trade.
5. THE ECONOMIST, London, 1985, vol 294, No 7381, p 56.
6. GRANMA, Havana, 22 May 1984.
7. CURRENT HISTORY, Philadelphia, 1983, vol 82, No 481, p 67.
8. GRANMA, 22 May 1984.
9. ZA RUBEZHOM, 1985, No 4, p 18.
10. Ibid.
11. GRANMA, 17 May 1984.
12. LE MONDE, 6 May 1986.
13. CAMBIO 16, Madrid, 1984, No 654, p 85.

14. ZA RUBEZHOM, 1985, No 4, p 17.
15. CAMBIO 16, 1984, No 654, p 84.
16. For a discussion of the method of falsification, see THE ECONOMIST, London, 1983, vol 286, No 7276, p 54.
17. GRANMA, 17 May 1984.
18. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Paris, November 1985, pp 16-17.
19. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, Prague, 1983, No 10, p 73.
20. AFRIQUE-ASIE, Paris, 1984, No 331, p 38.
21. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1984, No 6, p 76.
22. MORNING STAR, London, 29 April 1981.
23. Ibid.
24. NEWSWEEK, 1984, vol CIV, No 20, p 38.
25. WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Washington, 1984, vol 12, No 8, pp 785, 794.
26. "ABECOR Country Report. Paraguay," Dorset, August 1985.
27. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1984, No 6, p 73.
28. AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1984, No 331, p 38.
29. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, The Hague, 3 August 1984.
30. SUNDAY TIMES, London, 22 September 1985; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, November 1985, pp 16-17.
31. Ibid.
32. NEWSWEEK, 1986, vol CVII, No 19, p 41.
33. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Washington, 1985, vol 85, No 2095, p 21; No 2100, p 14.
34. NEWSWEEK, 1986, vol CVII, No 19, p 41.
35. THE ECONOMIST, 1986, vol 299, No 7445, p 39.
36. LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REPORT, London, 1986, No 8, p 2.
37. Ibid., 1986, No 6, p 9.

- 38. Ibid.
- 39. Ibid., 1986, No 18, p 3.
- 40. IZVESTIYA, 6 March 1986.
- 41. NEWSWEEK, 1986, vol CVII, No 19, p 41.
- 42. THE ECONOMIST, 1986, vol 298, No 7445, p 39.
- 43. LE MONDE, 6 May 1986.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

SANDINISTA REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES WITH ATLANTIC COAST INDIANS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 86 (signed to press 17 Sep 86)
pp 46-52

[Article by A. P. Strogov: "Nicaragua on the Road to the Resolution of the Nationality Problem"]

[Text] Many revolutions in emerging countries have to solve the nationality problem they inherited from the time when the world was divided into spheres of influence by imperialist powers. Nicaragua is no exception to this rule. The ethnic composition of its population is heterogeneous: Most of the population is Mestizo, the descendants of the conquistadors and the Indian tribes inhabiting the country's Pacific coast in the pre-Columbian era. All of them regard Spanish as their native language, the majority are practicing Catholics and they represent the backbone of the Nicaraguan nationality. The ethnic groups populating Nicaragua's Atlantic coast represent a relative minority (3.5 percent): These are the Misquitos, Negroes, Sumos, Caribs and Ramas, who speak different languages. In spite of the absolute majority of Mestizos in this region (64.5 percent), its ethnic characteristics are determined by Misquito Indians and Negroes.

During the era of colonial rule, the Spaniards settled on what is now the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, drawn there by the dry and relatively cool climate and the rich volcanic soil, and in the north and center of the country, where gold and silver were discovered. The Atlantic coast (with its humid tropical climate and marshy forests) had only one Spanish settlement--San Juan del Norte, a port in the San Juan delta and a trans-shipment point for Central American gold, silver, pelts and other resources being sent to Spain. The coast was inhabited by isolated Indian tribes and had a multitude of bays and lagoons, which were readily put to use by pirates. The English took an interest in the region in the 1630's, when the conquest of Belize was followed by attempts to gain new possessions from Spain. In contrast to the Spaniards, who had subjugated the natives by fire and sword, England established commercial contacts with them, won the confidence of tribes and then supplied them with weapons to fight the Spaniards. The Misquito Indians were the strongest tribe on the coast, and with the support of the English they placed all other tribes under their own command (the Ulua, Cucra, Tuanca and Matagalpa, who were also called "Sumu"--that is, wild Indians--and the Ramas). In the middle of the 18th century England "elected" one of the Misquito chiefs the

"king" and concluded a protectorate agreement with him, which Spain naturally did not recognize. The English responded by sending a military expedition to the region in 1780--headed by Lieutenant Nelson, the future hero of Trafalgar--to take control of the San Juan River, which was already strategically important even then. Nelson lost an eye and 190 of his 200 men, but he nevertheless seized the Castillo fortress on the San Juan River and defended the right of the "kingdom" of Misquitia to exist. The English remained the complete masters of the kingdom until 1860, when they had to acknowledge Nicaragua's sovereignty over Misquitia but insisted on the preservation of its autonomy. The "king" of the Misquitos began to be called a chief and had a state council and government. The region soon had its own criminal and civil code. Despite the fact that the real levers of power were still in the hands of the English consul, the autonomous status served the inhabitants of Misquitia and their descendants as an expression of their ethnic differences and distinctions from the "Spaniards" of the Pacific coast.

Ethnic Composition of Population* of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast

<u>Ethnic groups</u>	<u>Number of people</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Language</u>
Mestizo	182,377	64.5	Spanish
Misquito	66,994	23.8	Misquito
Negro	25,723	9.1	English
Sumo	4,851	1.7	Sumo
Carib	1,487	0.5	Garifono
Rama	649	0.2	Rama

* Total population of country--2,834,500 (in 1983).

Source: "Centro de Investigacion y Documentacion de la Costa Atlantica, 1983" quoted in PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, Managua, 1985, No 26, p 34.

American banana, lumber, gold mining, cattle breeding and shipping companies rushed to Misquitia and quickly dominated its economy. Under pressure from them, the United States urged the liberal government of J. Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) to conquer the reservation, cancel all of the Indians' privileges and deport the autonomous government and the consul from Great Britain to Jamaica. The desperate Misquitos sent a message to Queen Victoria, saying: "We have fallen into the hands of a government and people who do not have the slightest interest in, or sympathy for, the inhabitants of Misquitia. Since our habits, customs, religions, laws and languages are different, the achievement of unity is impossible."¹

In 1900 the Zelaya government prohibited English-language instruction in the schools of the Atlantic coast. This was the beginning of a long period of neglect, a period of slumber disturbed only by the American companies rapaciously exploiting the natural resources of the former kingdom of Misquitia.

The arrival of the Sandinista revolution on the Atlantic coast was unexpected and was largely viewed as the replacement of one "Spanish" government by another. The population of this region took almost no part in the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, but completely supported the elimination of the old bureaucracy, the departure of foreign corporations, the arrival of the first activists of the campaign for the eradication of illiteracy, and the construction of state schools and hospitals. The revolution gave them the hope that their autonomy would soon be restored and their ethnic distinctions would be secured.

At the end of 1979 the MISURASATA (the association of the Misquito, Sumo and Rama Indians) organization was formed by the separate Indian groups. It was headed by (Stedmen Fagot), a biologist by profession, a former agent of Somoza's secret police, and an excellent speaker and demagogue possessed by great personal ambitions. The FSLN leaders were tolerant of (Fagot's) past, tried not to interfere in the activities of this organization, and gave it financial, material and technical support in the hope of broader contacts with the ethnic groups of the Atlantic coast. (Fagot), however, took energetic action, with the aid of the CIA, to stir up nationalist feelings among the Indians and promised them territorial self-determination, income from gold mines, timber exploitation and the fishing trade, and the creation of their own army.² MISURASATA also used the campaign for the eradication of illiteracy among the Indians, which was conducted in their native languages, for its own purposes. During this campaign, 12,600 people were educated. Campaign activists were chosen from among (Fagot's) supporters, were sent to Puerto Cabezas for training and then planted the idea of the separation of the Atlantic coast from Nicaragua in the minds of their students. The Nicaraguan Institute of the Atlantic Coast was founded in 1980. It was something like a ministry and was supposed to aid in carrying out the plans for the development of the region: the construction of schools, hospitals and industrial, logging, woodworking and fish enterprises. The peculiarities of the coast's socio-economic structure were not, however, taken into account in its activities. Besides this, FSLN activists tried to create the same kind of social institutions and public organizations here as in the rest of the country, without consideration for the fact that the population had retained a largely patriarchal order: The primary social unit was still the community or tribe, and these were headed by elders or chiefs. It is therefore understandable that the natives reacted to these innovations with indifference, if not outright hostility.

The combination of these factors led to a crisis on the coast in summer 1981. The government responded to the increase in MISURASATA separatist demonstrations by ordering the arrest of (Fagot). Contrary to the Sandinistas' expectations, this did not cause (Fagot) to lose his support among the Misquitos, for whom Somoza was just another "Spanish" president. The Indian communities demanded the release of their leader. In June 1981 he was freed and took refuge in Honduras, declaring war on the Sandinistas from there. The same thing happened to another Indian leader, Brooklyn Rivera, who evaded house arrest, fled to Costa Rica, and also opposed Managua. Analyzing this situation, Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior T. Borge, member of the FSLN national leadership, remarked: "We were on the verge of losing Misquito

support for the revolution, because we had made so many mistakes in our relations with the Atlantic coast in general and the Misquitos in particular that the extremely severe crisis there, which imperialism made use of, was the logical result. I frankly believe that most of this was our own fault."³

In an attempt to relieve tension, the government and FSLN published a Declaration of the Principles of the Sandinista Popular Revolution with Regard to the Indian Communities of the Atlantic Coast on 12 August 1981. It declared the Indians' right to preserve their cultural and linguistic traditions, to participate in the social, economic and political affairs of the country, to communal land and to part of the income from timber exploitation. In addition, however, the document underscored the single and undivided sovereignty of the Nicaraguan nation, called Spanish the official language and declared natural resources to be the property of all the people.⁴

In spite of this, the crisis on the Atlantic coast grew more acute. (Fagot) renamed his organization MISURA and sided with the counterrevolutionary "Nicaraguan Democratic Forces" (FDN), a group of former members of Somoza's national guard. Through this organization and directly from the CIA, he received weapons, ammunition and the opportunity to conduct electronic warfare from the territory of Honduras. Rivera, who headed MISURASATA, became the ally of another counterrevolutionary organization, the "Revolutionary Democratic Alliance" (ARDE), controlled by E. Pastora from Costa Rican territory. In spite of a number of "ideological" differences of opinion, the two counterrevolutionary groups used the same methods: ambushes, the kidnapping of peasants, robbery, raids on cooperatives and the brutal treatment of captured Sandinistas.

At the end of 1981 MISURA and the FDN began the preparations for Operation "Red Christmas," which would include an uprising by the Misquito communities near the Coco River, the seizure of northeastern Nicaragua and the establishment of a provisional government in Puerto Cabezas, which would announce the separation of the Atlantic coast from Nicaragua and would ask the United States for assistance. The signal for the beginning of the operation was a message from (Fagot) to the Indian communities, broadcast by the "September 15" counterrevolutionary radio station, reporting that the Sandinistas would begin bombing Indian villages. This obvious lie sent 10,000 Misquitos across the border to Honduras. In response, the Sandinistas resettled the remaining 200 Indian communities in the heartland and cleared the coastal strip of all civilians. Well-organized settlements were built for the Misquitos, Sumos and Ramas in the (Tasba Pri) region, with schools, stores and medical facilities, and they were given fertile land and the means of its cultivation. In spite of this, the resettlement erected an impermeable wall between the Indians and the government.

The government's main argument in favor of the resettlement was the possibility that the Misquitos who did not move to Honduras could be destroyed by counterrevolutionary forces. The Indians later responded to this argument: "We should have been left to die there. If we have to die, we have to die. The River Coco is our life and death. We should not have been moved."⁵ For the Misquitos this river was not merely the place where they lived. It

was the center of their world and their religious beliefs, it was their cradle and grave. The resettlement in the heartland aroused the anger of the Indians who had moved to Honduras and those inhabiting the coastal inlands. Making use of their familiarity with the location, they controlled vast regions and inflicted severe damages on the Sandinista People's Army and economic objects.

The Moravian Church (a offshoot of Protestantism), which conducted missionary activity and had a great deal of influence among the Indians, played a special role in the conflict on the coast. It had a monopoly on education, public health and the distribution of international aid among the Misquitos. The victory of the Sandinista revolution and the first FSLN undertakings on the Atlantic coast (the eradication of illiteracy and the organization of medical treatment) jeopardized this monopoly, and the church actively supported the armed struggle of its parishioners, while many ministers became the military chaplains of Indian brigades.

American imperialism took every opportunity to fuel the separatist feelings of the Misquitos and other tribes, regarding them as a shock force and using them to weaken the Nicaraguan revolution. In the military sense, the Indian organizations had an advantage over the FDN and ARDE because they had the support of Indians in refugee camps. It is true that the camps were closely guarded by the Honduran army: Only members of the armed brigades leaving for Nicaragua were allowed out of the camps.

The FSLN leadership's public acknowledgement of the mistakes it had made in its treatment of the Atlantic coast Indians and the realization of the need for a political solution to the nationality problem led to the creation of the National Commission on the Autonomy of the Atlantic Coast in December 1984. It was headed first by member of the front national leadership L. Carrion and then by T. Borge after May 1985. Commission activities were developed in two areas. First of all, the preparation and discussion of a draft law on autonomy in the coastal communities were organized. Secondly, negotiations were instituted with Indian organizations: with MISURASATA leader Rivera in Bogota and Mexico in December 1984, and with some MISURA leaders in north-eastern Nicaragua in May 1985. These talks were held under difficult conditions, with Indian leaders repeatedly breaking them off or advancing a multitude of preliminary conditions. Nevertheless, an armistice agreement had been concluded with both organizations by May 1985, including the renunciation of military operations by both sides, the withdrawal of Sandinista army units from the settlements of Indian communities and the retention of forces only in strategic locations, amnesty for coastal inhabitants serving prison sentences and the cancellation of travel restrictions. In spite of the fact that the ceasefire was repeatedly violated by extremist Indian groups, the armistice caused thousands of well-armed fighters to leave the counterrevolutionary forces.

The most important result of the government's peace talks with the Indian organizations was the agreement to return the Misquitos in settlements in the interior to the banks of the Coco. To the amazement of many Sandinistas, they left their comfortable homes and unharvested fields without regrets and set off, often without even waiting for the trucks assigned to them for the

move, for their native lands, where they had to rebuild their settlements. The FSLN leadership realized the dangers of this move and the possibility of the resumption of the Indian communities' contacts with the counterrevolutionaries entrenched in Honduras: The Misquitos did not recognize the state border along the Coco, which was established by the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1960, and regarded both banks of their sacred river as their homeland. In spite of the fact that many of these fears were justified, the Sandinistas agreed to the move in an attempt to eliminate the seat of hostilities on the coast.

A radical solution to the nationality problem in Nicaragua is set forth in the fundamental document of the National Commission on Autonomy. The six ethnic groups of the coast will elect an assembly and a government, which will be in charge of administrative affairs, public health and law enforcement, as well as the drafting of legislation in line with ethnic traditions, particularly inheritance rights. Managua will still be in charge of national defense, foreign policy and planning, with various forms of participation by the autonomous government.

The main discussions between the representatives of the FSLN and the Indian organizations concerned two matters: the defense of the coast and the use of natural resources. The government defended the principle of a single regular army under a unified command. MISURA and MISURASATA insisted on the retention of their military structure, strategy and tactics of people's warfare, which, in their opinion, is more adaptable to local conditions and can be used in struggle against counterrevolutionary gangs and in the repulsion of foreign aggression. In their opinion, the continued arming of the Indians should guarantee the government's observance of agreements.

A temporary compromise solution to the problem of coastal defense was compulsory military service by Indians in their native regions and the conversion of the Indian brigades into subdivisions of the people's militia.

In the discussion of natural resources, the Indian organizations insisted on the management of gold, silver and precious metal mining, the shrimp and lobster trade and logging operations by the autonomous government, which would award concessions to state enterprises. The leaders of the MISURA organization demanded that Atlantic coast enterprises be authorized to deal with foreign markets, with the aim of restoring the traditional trade relations with Caribbean countries.

An important move toward dialogue took place in the Sandinista government's relations with the Moravian Church. Vice-Coordinator B. Arce of the Executive Commission of the FSLN national leadership attended the seventh church synod in February 1986 as an honored guest and speaker. The synod issued a statement condemning the "unjust and futile war imposed by external forces" and expressing "complete support for the autonomization of the Atlantic coast, which is what the people want."⁶

The granting of genuine autonomy to the Indians of Nicaragua, the achievement of lasting peace in this region and the just resolution of the nationality

problem constitute a difficult process. It has been complicated by the operations of several extremist Indian organizations on the coast, advocating the continuation of hostilities and receiving generous assistance from the United States. Besides this, Rivera stopped participating in the talks with the government when his organization was not recognized as the only representative of the ethnic groups of the Atlantic coast.

In spite of all these difficulties, especially the subversive activity of the United States, the open and honest policy of the Nicaraguan Government and its acknowledgement of its own mistakes are laying the foundation for peace in this part of Nicaragua. The adoption of a new constitution, with a section on the autonomy of the Indian people and communities of the Atlantic coast, was an important milestone on this road. It secures the full rights of the Indians to preserve and develop their culture, language and religion and to organize their socioeconomic affairs in accordance with their ethnic traditions. The new constitutional articles guaranteeing autonomy were widely discussed in Indian communities, attesting to the local population's desire to cooperate with the revolutionary regime. The resolution of the nationality problem in Nicaragua is entering a new and important phase.

FOOTNOTES

1. BARRICADA, Managua, 18 November 1985.
2. "Nicaragua: la Costa Atlantica vista por el FSLN. Entrevista a Luis Carrion," PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, Managua, 1985, No 20, p 27.
3. Quoted in NUEVO AMANECER CULTURAL, Managua, 21 August 1985.
4. "Declaracion de Principios de la Revolucion Popular Sandinista sobre las comunidades indigenas de la Costa Atlantica," in "La Democracia participativa en Nicaragua," Managua, 1985, pp 159-160.
5. J. J. Gonzalez, "MISURA: contacto directo," PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, 1985, No 26, p 45.
6. BARRICADA, 2 March 1986.

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LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

HAVANA ROUNDTABLE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 86 (signed to press 17 Sep 86)
pp 130-131

[Report by V. N. Lunin, magazine correspondent for Cuba and the Caribbean,
on roundtable discussion in Havana in May 1986]

[Text] A delegation from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace went to Cuba in May 1986. The members were Twice Hero of the Soviet Union G. M. Grechko, deputy chairman of the committee and pilot-astronaut of the USSR; writer Donat Kalnach, chairman of the Latvian Committee for the Defense of Peace; and A. D. Bekarevich, head of the Cuba sector of the Latin America Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

The main event during their visit was a roundtable discussion of "Outer Space and Its Peaceful Use," organized by the Cuban Movement for Peace and National Sovereignty and attended by the members of the Soviet delegation and by Latin America's first astronaut A. Tamallo Mendez, President J. Altschuler of the Cuban unit of the Interkosmos Commission, prominent scientists and public spokesmen. Various aspects of the Soviet program for the peaceful conquest of outer space and Soviet-Cuban cooperation in this field were analyzed during the discussion.

Attention was focused on the constructive and consistent efforts of the Soviet Union to defend peace, guarantee the equal security of states and create an atmosphere of international trust and cooperation. This policy, as speakers noted, is clearly embodied in the program to rid the earth of nuclear and chemical weapons in the next 15 years, announced on 15 January of this year by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and unanimously approved by the 27th CPSU Congress. The Soviet initiative in the termination of nuclear tests also had great international repercussions. The militarist plans of the Reagan Administration and its dreams of "Star Wars" and of military superiority in space were condemned at the conference. In particular, G. M. Grechko stressed that the Soviet Union resolutely opposes the military conquest of outer space and the start of an arms race in space, close to the earth's atmosphere.

Current events were discussed by A. D. Bekarevich, who showed how closely the arms race and the militarization of space are connected with the growing

foreign debt of the Latin American countries and the critical state of their economies. In this context, the vital importance of the struggle for peace to the countries of this region was underscored.

The signing of the first long-term agreement on cooperation by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Cuban Movement for Peace and National Sovereignty was the most important result of the Soviet delegation's visit to the Republic of Cuba. There is no question that it signifies an important era in the development of cooperation by public organizations in the two countries and that it meets the interests of all states and peoples concerned about imperialism's escalation of international tension and associating the prospects for the resolution of acute economic and social problems with the restoration of the climate of detente.

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

MOSCOW COMMENTARY ASSAILS U.S.-IRAN ARMS DEALS

PM261225 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 22 Nov 86 p 3

[Political observer Sergey Losev "View of Events": "Neoglobalist Subterfuges"]

[Excerpt] The senseless and bloody war between Iran and Iraq is already into its 7th year, and the sides have lost almost 1 million killed or wounded. The United Nations is making efforts to end this internecine conflict. Washington has hitherto averred that the United States observes "strict neutrality" and is interested in the speediest ending of the war.

But at the very time that U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz was assuring the Arab countries that his country does not support Iran in the war against Iraq the U.S. National Security Council was engaged in supplying arms to Iran. "It is now becoming obvious," the American Cox news service noted, "that our government lied not only to our opponents but also to our allies and the entire population of the country."

At a 17 November meeting in Washington the ambassadors of 16 Arab League states quite justifiably described the supplies of American arms to Iran "as a blatant act of U.S. duplicity." "The general opinion," League spokesman Maqsdud stated, "is that secret arms supplies to Iran are a violation of the assurances given to the Arab countries by Washington."

On 17 January this year, it transpires, R. Reagan signed a secret directive authorizing covert supplies to Iran of combat hardware and spare parts for American arms purchased back under the Shah's regime: In the seventies the United States created gigantic stockpiles of modern offensive arms worth a total of 16 billion dollars on Iranian territory in the vicinity of the Soviet Union's southern borders. And the Pentagon is evidently totally unable to accept the thought of losing this strategic bridgehead as a result of the fall of the Shah's regime.

The White House entrusted the mission of resuming the arms deal with Iran to former presidential national security assistant R. McFarlane. He flew to Tehran on a forged Irish passport. As a "dessert" course to the load of spare parts delivered by American military transport aircraft he brought the Iranian military a cake in the shape of a big key with which the administration wanted to symbolically "unlock" Iranian-American relations, which were

severed after the overthrow of the Shah's pro-American regime. The "Islamic Revolution Guards," who are in competition with the military, did not accept this symbol, ate the gift cake at the airport, and confiscated the spare parts. All subsequent supplies of arms and spare parts were made not through the capital's airport but through Tabriz. But the main cargoes of weapons went by ship from Israel to the port of Bandar-e 'Abbas, which is controlled by the Army.

McFarlane's mission fitted into the framework of U.S. Near East policy, which is aimed at preventing the convening of an international conference on the Near East and thwarting any possibility of achieving a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In fueling the flames of the Iran-Iraq war the United States and Israel--allies under the strategic alliance--have been pursuing quite definite objectives: the continuation of this conflict ties Iraq's hands and rules out the possibility of it playing an active part in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the continuation of the war provides the United States with a pretext for expanding its interference in the Persian Gulf zone and restoring its positions in Iran.

"According to informed sources," THE WASHINGTON POST points out, "the Reagan Administration's secret contacts and arms supplies to Iran form part of secret CIA operations whose aim is to win the favor of Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime and at the same time support Iranian emigres seeking to overthrow him."

In secret instructions on intelligence activity the U.S. President ordered the CIA to support Iranian emigres opposed to the Khomeyni regime. It is necessary to include here the granting of 6 million dollars to the main Iranian emigre movement, the financing of a radio station for Khomeyni opponents broadcasting from Egypt, and the granting of a mobile television transmitter which made it possible two months ago to organize an 11-minute broadcast to Iran in which Ali Reza, the son of the late Shah, spoke, promising: "I will return..."

At a 19 November press conference Reagan himself disclosed these hopes of a change in the system existing in Iran. "We have information," he said, "that there are various factions in Iran, and many of them consider that a change of government will take place quite soon..."

At the same press conference, striving to quell the wave of indignation which has built up in the United States in connection with the exposures of the administration's attempts to fuel the flames of the Iran-Iraq war, Reagan stated that he has ordered that "no more new consignments of weapons be sent to Iran."

In the United States itself the secret deal has intensified the crisis of confidence in the policy of an administration which has proved to be an inveterate liar. Many political observers are drawing parallels between the present situation and the crisis of confidence in the Johnson Administration at the height of the Vietnam adventure. A question put to R. Reagan by

an American journalist at his latest press conference is characteristic in this respect: "Public opinion polls show that many Americans simply do not believe you. Confidence in you has been seriously undermined. Can you restore it?"

In the view of THE TIMES of London, "the combination of recent U.S. foreign policy failures raises questions such as the president's ability to take correct decisions, choose competent advisers, and display proper political sensitivity. The Iranian fiasco has been Reagan's biggest mistake since he came to power. In any event the blow to Reagan's personal prestige is indisputable."

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MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA/SOUTH ASIA

SOVIET MUSLIMS VOICE SOLIDARITY WITH SYRIA

PM101232 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "In Support of the Syrian People"]

[Text] In connection with the unbridled anti-Syrian campaign launched by Britain, the United States, and some other Western countries, the heads of the Soviet Union's four Muslim spiritual administrations have published a statement which, in particular, stresses that Soviet Muslims are deeply alarmed at the actions of the forces of imperialism and Zionism who are fueling the situation around Syria. Political blackmail, economic blockade, and even the use of weapons against the freedom-loving Muslim people--this is what the imperialist forces' anti-Arab, anti-Muslim course is like in practice.

While pretending to be a "defender of Islam and Muslims," U.S. imperialism in fact helped Israel to expel the Arab people of Palestine from their age-old lands. The United States is doing its utmost to prolong the fratricidal war between Iran and Iraq. Together with certain other Western countries, the United States and Israel are doing all they can to hinder a just settlement of the Near East problem.

It was on orders from Washington that missile and bomb strikes were made against Muslim civilian populations in Lebanon and Libya. Now Syria, whose firm, anti-imperialist course is not to the U.S. Administration's liking, is being threatened. As in the case of Libya, Syria is being blatantly slandered and accused of terrorism.

At this difficult hour for fraternal Syria the Muslims of the Soviet Union express complete solidarity with the just struggle of the Muslim people of that country who are boldly defending their honor and independence and are struggling for a just solution of the Near East problem.

In conclusion the authors of the statement urge the peoples of the Arab countries to closely unite their ranks and organize a rebuff to the aggressive anti-Arab actions of imperialism and Zionism and resolutely support the Syrian people.

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